Central Asia has once again become a platform for the “Great Game,” an intense geopolitical competition between East and West.
Author: Andrey Serenko, head of the Center for the Study of Afghan Politics (Russia)
Full text of my comment for the respected Kazakhstani resource Exclusive
The Central Asian region today is turning, as the Americans say, into “the girl that everyone wants.” In the new geopolitical realities that arose after the spring of 2022, Central Asia as a whole and its countries acquired an important status as a region influencing global problems and, above all, the problem of new competition between the West and the East.
For Russia, the Central Asian region is a strategic rear through which, among other things, the tasks of overcoming the negative impact of Western economic sanctions are solved. Along with the “communication channels” with Iran through the Caspian Sea and Chinese support, the logistics of Central Asia have turned into a real “lifeline” for Russia. Therefore, Moscow seeks to maintain and strengthen its multi-level control over this region.
For the same reason - the importance of the Central Asian region for Russia - representatives and institutions of the Western bloc, waging a hybrid war with Moscow, have become more active here. They seek, if not to collapse, then to weaken as much as possible Russian positions in the Central Asian region, offering their alternative development projects to the local elites, while at the same time, not without success, using levers of pressure on them (primarily at the expense of property, real estate and bank accounts located in Western countries).
In addition, the United States and its allies are trying to strengthen their capabilities in the Central Asian region in the growing game against China. The main events in this rivalry are still ahead, perhaps they should be expected after the end of the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, far-sighted strategists in Washington, London, Brussels, and other European capitals are already trying to create a new infrastructure to put pressure on Beijing’s position in this part of the post-Soviet space.
Central Asia has once again become a platform for the “Great Game,” an intense geopolitical competition between East and West. This has both its pros and cons. One of the advantages is the opportunity for countries in the region to play on the contradictions of Moscow, Beijing, and their Western competitors. This promises new investments, political support, and new development opportunities for the leadership of Central Asian states and local elites. On the downside, intractable or overly greedy local elites are muzzled in the form of sanctions, threats of a “color revolution,” and even the open use of military force. Including unconventional ones, for example, in the form of various jihadist groups stationed in Afghanistan, but seeking expansion into Central Asia.
In other words, the situation forces the regional elites to develop maximum gutta-percha and flexibility of the spine to avoid negative threats and at the same time not to miss the benefits flowing directly into their hands from the desire of the participants in the “great game” to please the Central Asian ruling clans and public opinion.
Now we have the opportunity to observe a demonstration of this “political fitness” in real-time. Let's see who ultimately manages to achieve the perfect balance in this fascinating process.
The influence of the Afghan factor on the situation in Central Asia is quite obvious and severe. Afghanistan has been under the control of the largest international terrorist organization professing the ideology of jihad for more than two years. Tens of thousands of militants from Central Asia are based on Afghan territory. This is a constant factor of pressure on the region, a gun hanging on the local political scene. And by the laws of drama, it has a very serious chance of shooting one day.
The countries of Central Asia are each trying to stop this threat in their way. Tajikistan, for example, has relied on supporting the forces of the Afghan military resistance to the Taliban regime, considering these forces as a reserve for externally covering the state border and deterring terrorists.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, on the contrary, are trying to appease the jihadist leadership of the Taliban with trade and economic initiatives and promises of financial support. Curiously, the Taliban themselves consider such practices a form of payment of jizya - a special tax for security.
At the current stage, when the Taliban leaders adhere to a strategy of active personal enrichment, attempts to appease them economically, through direct bribery, may have some success. But how long it will last is a serious question. The Russian proverb about the wolf, which no matter how much you feed, still looks into the forest, has too often turned out to be true in politics.
In my opinion, the jihadist threat to the Central Asian region has prospects for strengthening. Moreover, this tool can be used not only by irreconcilable religious radicals but also by the intelligence services of some Western and regional countries, which have a long history of working with armed Islamic extremists.
If the ruling groups in the countries of Central Asia turn out to be not too responsive to the proposals of external participants in the “great game,” the jihadist communities that are accumulating forces and resources under the umbrella of the Taliban dictatorship in Afghanistan may well be used against them.
By the way, the first alarming signals in this regard for Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are already beginning to appear. Let's hope that these countries and the region as a whole will be able to avoid the most negative scenarios for the development of the situation.
