How are the rules of the geopolitical game changing in South Asia?
By Khaledin Ziaei, Head of the Educational Discourse of the Nation Think Tank, especially for “Sangar”
Over the past four decades, Afghanistan has remained a key geopolitical hub in South Asia. Pakistan has consistently sought to keep the governments in Kabul within its sphere of influence through religious organizations and ethnic networks. However, the fall of the Afghan Republic in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return fundamentally reshaped the regional security architecture.
Islamabad had expected the Taliban’s rise to power to strengthen border security and reduce the threat from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The reality proved otherwise: over the past three years, cross-border attacks and deadly operations against the Pakistani army have increased, while Kabul has repeatedly accused Islamabad of violating its airspace and engaging in military aggression.
Against this backdrop, the recent visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi, along with India’s official upgrade of its diplomatic mission in Kabul to embassy status, marked a major turning point in regional relations. This move symbolizes a shift in Taliban policy toward establishing a new balance of power with Pakistan.
Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived in India with tangible achievements: a day before his meetings with Indian officials, Pakistani Taliban, with support from Afghan Taliban, killed 20 Pakistani soldiers and wounded around 50. This operation effectively became a symbolic achievement for Muttaqi and a form of “gift” to Indian officials. During the meetings, he declared:
“We have kept our word and will continue to act according to our promises. Now you must do the same — provide comprehensive support to the Emirate and, above all, officially recognize our government.”
Following Muttaqi’s meetings, India-Taliban relations advanced to a new level: the mission in Kabul was upgraded to an embassy, and ambassadorial exchanges took place. This effectively represented formal recognition of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate as a state. Over the past four years, India has unprecedentedly strengthened its ties with the Taliban, revising its foreign policy approach.
For the first time since the Taliban’s return to power, Indian authorities ceremonially received the Emirate’s Foreign Minister. During the bilateral meeting in New Delhi between India’s National Security Council Committee and the Taliban delegation led by Muttaqi, several open and secret agreements were signed, including a key security pact. It commits India, in the event of war between Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate, to provide comprehensive support to the Emirate — militarily, through intelligence, financially, and politically.
After the signing of this agreement, relations between the Taliban and Pakistan entered a new phase. Active intelligence warfare — both covert and overt — has begun between India and Pakistan on one side, and between Pakistan and the Taliban Emirate on the other. The assassination of Salim Paygir was Pakistan’s first reaction to Muttaqi’s visit to India. Furthermore, Pakistan’s overnight airstrikes on Kabul and four other provinces, targeting leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, reinforced this reality.
Moreover, for the first time in four years of the Emirate’s rule in Afghanistan, Pakistani authorities publicly claimed responsibility for the attack on Kabul and the assassination of Noor Wali Masood in the heart of the city. This clearly demonstrates a rapid and angry reaction to Muttaqi’s India visit and the signing of the security agreement.
It should be noted that such sequential and unpredictable incidents are likely to increase in the coming days. In Delhi, following Pakistan’s airstrikes on Kabul and five other Afghan provinces, Muttaqi is making strenuous efforts to persuade Indian military and security officials to begin practical implementation of the security agreement as soon as possible. He seeks to draw India’s attention to the need for comprehensive support to the Taliban Emirate in countering Pakistani attacks within the framework of the agreement. Taliban leaders, both in Kandahar and Kabul, believe that India’s involvement in Afghan affairs must be immediate to establish balance and contain Pakistan’s influence.
Conclusions
Relations between Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban have entered a new phase of complexity and multipolarity. Islamabad, which once viewed the Taliban as a tool of influence, now faces the bitter reality of losing control over Kabul. Meanwhile, the Taliban, relying on emerging ties with India and other Asian powers, seeks to consolidate political independence and increase international legitimacy.
However, Afghanistan’s fragile security structure, the economic crisis, and domestic pressures in Pakistan prevent either side from engaging in a full-scale confrontation. Consequently, the future of their relations can be described as “permanent tension without full-scale war” — a pattern likely to persist for several years.
Ultimately, any lasting stability along Afghanistan’s eastern borders and Pakistan’s northwest depends on establishing regional security dialogues, containing Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and refraining from using non-state actors as tools in geopolitical competition.
Finally, the implementation of such policies will weaken the authority and legitimacy of the Taliban Emirate, shorten its lifespan, and pave the way for the imminent collapse of its tyrannical and illegitimate regime.
