Why Does Zalmay Khalilzad Travel to Kabul?
Author: Ahmad Rashad Mirzada
In recent months, we have witnessed frequent trips by Zalmay Khalilzad to Kabul. These visits take place under conditions in which the name “Afghanistan” is not officially mentioned in the U.S. National Security Doctrine, and, apparently, this territory is no longer among Washington’s strategic priorities. A fundamental question thus arises: even though the geography known as Afghanistan is no longer at the center of official U.S. attention, why does one of the key figures in Western political planning continue to operate actively there?
In this article, I will attempt to answer this question. I approach the issue from an ideological perspective—namely, through the connection between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, both of which Khalilzad supported in the past and continues to support today. For many years, he has linked the network-based model of U.S. foreign policy with ethnic politics, and today he seeks to secure a place for his ethnic geography in the great game of the post-hegemonic world order. Zalmay Khalilzad is a multi-layered actor who simultaneously embodies the logic of the global neoliberal order and the ethnic and political interests embedded in the geography known as Afghanistan.
1 - Theoretical Framework of Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism, as David Harvey explains, is not merely an economic project, but also a model for organizing power, the state, and society—one that, since the 1980s, has encompassed all spheres of governance in Western countries, including security and foreign policy. Within this logic, the state is neither eliminated nor weakened; rather, it transforms from a direct interventionist into a regulator and overseer.
I briefly point to the era of Ronald Reagan. It was then that the alliance between economic neoliberalism and foreign policy became a turning point. While the state retreated from social welfare domains, transnational networks, think tanks, and non-state actors were strengthened in foreign policy. Gradually, foreign policy shifted from an institutional process to a networked and privatized one, in which individuals—rather than institutions—became the carriers of political projects.
Within this framework, Zalmay Khalilzad represents a vivid example of an actor who carries the legacy of that era and today plays the role of a restraining and regulating intermediary between the Taliban and the powers involved.
Since my analysis focuses on Khalilzad, who is widely known as an American neoconservative, I will, without delving into a detailed comparison of the two ideologies, briefly touch upon his neoliberal transformation as well.
Neoconservatism, especially after September 11, emphasized active intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, state-building, and ideological reconstruction. The state-building project in the geography known as Afghanistan was a clear reflection of the neoconservative approach, combined with strong elements of neoliberalism. The collapse of that project amounted, in fact, to the failure of both ideologies in the cursed geography called Afghanistan. This time, however, Khalilzad seeks to use European neoliberalism—whose center of gravity lies in London—to achieve his goals.
Despite Khalilzad’s formation within American academic and political institutions, his ethnic identity and political memory have played a decisive role in his actions. He originates from a Pashtun social and ethnic milieu—a milieu that has historically defined the structure of power in the geography known as Afghanistan. An examination of his activities across different periods, especially over the past 30 years, shows that preserving the central role of Pashtuns/Afghans in the power structure, regardless of the form of political system, has always been of primary importance to him—whether under Western-backed governments or under Taliban rule.
From this perspective, Khalilzad’s frequent trips to Kabul can be analyzed exclusively within the framework of managing the situation in favor of an ethnocentric order of power.
If above I discussed the relationship between neoconservatism and neoliberalism in the geography known as Afghanistan, I now turn to their contradiction.
2 - Neoconservatism versus Neoliberalism in the Geography Known as Afghanistan
After the U.S. intervention in 2001, the geography known as Afghanistan was transformed into a laboratory for reconstructing the liberal world order. The drafting of the constitution, the creation of centralized institutions, and the imposition of the identity “Afghan” reflected this approach. However, even at the height of the project, ethnic dominance was not removed from the equation of power. The constitution remained ethnic, and the puppet authority, under the guise of elections, always remained Afghan (Pashtun). The chief architect of all this was Khalilzad.
It would not be a mistake to call Khalilzad one of the architects of the post-Taliban order 1.0, the failed Western state-building project, and the traditional logic of Afghan ethnocentric power. His support for Karzai and the strengthening of Pashtun elites represent only a small part of a much larger pattern.
The failure of state-building and its enormous costs transformed the so-called Afghanistan from a reconstruction project into an object of management. Within the new paradigm, the Taliban were accepted as an “effective” force for territorial control—not due to ideological alignment, but based on the logic of cost reduction and the containment of instability.
The West, led by the United States, withdrew, taking with it a large segment of the elite. America left, and the United Kingdom now seeks to fill its place. Britain, with its historical experience of indirect rule, plays the role of a backstage regulator in the new order. The use of intermediaries such as Khalilzad and the acceptance of an ethnocentric power structure are part of this approach.
It is now possible to speak of a kind of redistribution of roles among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia.
While the United States is focusing on competition with China, the American continent, and domestic issues, the United Kingdom, by contrast, is playing a more active role in the political and informational regulation of the geography known as Afghanistan and broader regions that once formed part of the classical “Great Game.”
Russia, while avoiding costly intervention, is deeply concerned about the formation of a state of “managed instability” overseen by Britain. China and Iran share this concern. Within the emerging environment, Khalilzad can be regarded as one of the key executors of the new Great Game.
Concluding Remarks
The frequent trips of Zalmay Khalilzad to Kabul cannot be explained by simplistic interpretations such as “personal travel” or “individual initiative.” These visits should be understood as a reflection of profound changes in the logic of Western European foreign policy—above all that of Britain—under conditions marking the end of the unipolar world. In this context, neoliberalism is shifting from the U.S.-centered model of the Donald Trump era toward Britain, returning the management of instability to regions that constituted the geopolitical core in the nineteenth century.
Eurasian anarchy lies ahead, and it is evident that Khalilzad is assuming a new role within it.
