The difference between Pashtuns and Tajiks from Uzbeks and Hazaras is that the former fight for their goals regardless of the interests of their patrons, while the Uzbeks and Hazaras, apparently, do not have a definition of their own interests. One can only see that their interests become victims of the interests of their patrons.
Author: Farid Ahmad, editor-in-chief of Sangar
In the photo: the marshal uniform of Abdulrashid Dostum on the Talib
The latest statements by Marshal Abdulrashid Dostum, leader of the Afghan National Movement Party, who considers himself the exclusive political representative of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan, indicate that he is pursuing a policy of begging concessions from the Taliban. Marshal Dostum knows full well that such a policy does not work against the Taliban. However, the implementation of such a policy clearly indicates that Marshal Dostum is taking a position under pressure from Turkey.
Also, if the news that Mawlawi Mahdi, the only Hazara commander in the Taliban government, was handed over to the Taliban after being arrested by Iranian intelligence agencies is true, it can be concluded that Iran colluded with the Taliban to prevent the formation of an anti-Taliban movement among the Hazaras and Shiites of Afghanistan. And in order for the Hazaras to fight for justice and their rights against the Taliban, they also face Iran as a big and serious obstacle.
Although in the past the Hazaras and Uzbeks were under the influence of Iran and Turkey, now it seems that their dependence has become much more intense than the generally accepted limits. In the past, of course, the dependence of the Hazara and Uzbek sides on Iran and Turkey was based on mutual needs and interests, but now it seems that this dependence has become one-sided. In other words, the Hazara and Uzbek political movements have become unilaterally dependent on Iran and Turkey, or at least Iran and Turkey have such an understanding of these relations and think that they can treat them as they want. In essence, these relationships have now become similar to the master-servant relationship model. Iran and Turkey as masters decide what they like and what they don't like for their subjects in Afghanistan (Hazaras and Uzbeks)! If Iran and Turkey decide that the Hazaras and Uzbeks of Afghanistan are forced to submit to mono-ethnic Pashtun autocratic rule, they have no right to protest and disobey!
Given the history of enmity between Marshal Dostum and the Taliban, it is impossible to determine Marshal Dostum's frequent peace offerings to the Taliban other than following orders from an outside force. Marshal Dostum is a man who not only is considered by the Taliban to be the killer of thousands of their fighters and is unwilling to accept him but even Taliban supporters and Pashtuns with a Taliban orientation have a hidden dislike for Marshal Dostum due to the events, as in Dasht Laili (1992), over the past 24 years. Even the fugitive president Ashraf Ghani, who once elected Marshal Dostum as his vice president, wrote articles about him in the Western media and called him a killer of Pashtuns.
Marshal Dostum has gradually entered the political arena from the military field since the time of Dr. Najibullah, and since then the Pashtun governments, including the Najib government, of which Marshal Dostum was one of the military pillars, have tried to eliminate him. These efforts continued until the time of Ashraf Ghani. When Marshal Dostum was also Deputy Prime Minister Ashraf Ghani!
In the photo: Dostum during the First Resistance, followed by the tragedy of Dasht Laili, where hundreds of Taliban were buried by Dostum's troops
At least Marshal Dostum did not forget what his commander Jurabek from the battlefield of Khost (1992) told him: “General Sahib, you did well not to come. It turns out it was all about you!” Commander Jurabek actually had in mind a conspiracy against Dostum. The plot was that Najib wanted to destroy him there at the hands of Jalaluddin Haqqani and the Khalqis.
Even when Marshal Dostum became the first vice president, he was not spared from the conspiracies that stemmed from his past feud with the Pashtun governments. In addition to the fact that Marshal Dostum was under strong political pressure from Ghani, a criminal case was opened against him in the case of Eshchi, and thus he never entered his office as the first vice president and, finally, they sent him to Turkey. In one case, the Hazara general Muradali Murad saved him from a Taliban siege, which, according to Marshal Dostum, was done in collusion with the government of the time, namely Hanif Atmar, secretary of security, and Masum Istanikzai, head of the Security Directorate.
According to the above, Marshal Dostum's talks with the Taliban do not make sense. When Pashtun democratic governments, formed under the slogan of ethnic participation in political life, and also needing Marshal Dostum to get Uzbek votes, refused to give him their rightful share and position in power, it is illogical to expect this from the Taliban.
Even the title of Marshal Ashraf Ghani was given to him under pressure from the Americans and the Turks. This was at a time when Ghani, in exchange for becoming his vice-president for a second term from the northern camp, of which Dostum was a prominent member, promised him the rank of marshal. But Ghani was reluctant to grant it because of Dostum's past feud with the Pashtuns, and then, when he signed the order under duress, refused to participate in the special and appropriate ceremony. Finally, Dr. Abdullah went to Juzjan and placed the rank of the marshal on Dostum's shoulders.
Therefore, if the Taliban want to negotiate with Marshal Dostum, they will most optimistically tell him that they will not avenge the murder of their fighters and that he can return to the country and spend the rest of his life in his house in Juzjan, like all ordinary people, which means house arrest. This is what the Taliban have been telling all their prominent political opponents. It is clear that Dostum cannot be satisfied with this, and if he does this under pressure from Turkey, then this will actually mean sacrificing the interests of Afghan Uzbeks to the interests of Turkey. Because it was Turkey that took the marshall hostage and wants him to act according to Ankara's plan. If this were not the case, Marshal Dostum probably would not have sat silent this year and would have taken action against the Taliban!
On the other hand, there are the Hazaras of Afghanistan who traditionally find themselves deprived of their civil and political rights under Pashtun governments and even claim to be in danger of genocide. After the war of the Afghan people against the Soviet Union, when seven jihadist organizations were created, the Hazaras entered politics and war in the form of Hizbi Wahdat - the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, led by Abdulali Mazari. Since that time, Hizbi Wahdat has been under the influence of the Islamic Republic, since most of its members were Hazara and Shia. Later, the Hizbi Wahdat parties that broke away, led by Muhaqqiq, Khalili, and Akbari, also maintained their relations with Tehran, and in fact, Iran pursued its interests in Afghanistan by supporting them. Iran followed this policy until a few years ago, but at some point became close to the Taliban, and this closeness actually meant undermining relations between the Shia-Hazara parties and Iran.
When the Taliban seized power again, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to adopt a policy of engagement with the Taliban in line with many countries in the region. Under this policy, Iran is said to have pledged to prevent Hazara's armed uprisings against the Taliban government. In return, the Taliban have made commitments to Iran that are said to revolve mainly around Iran's economic interests. Among other things, one can mention the conflict between Iran and Afghanistan over the water of the Khirmand River, in which the Taliban initially raised the issue of water in exchange for oil, but later moved away from their position and entered into soft relations with Iran.
In keeping with the Iran-Taliban alignment, it is said that Mahdi Balhabi, the only known Hazara Taliban commander, was arrested by Iranian security agents and then handed over to the Taliban. The Taliban killed him immediately.
Mawlawi Mahdi, the former head of the Taliban intelligence agency in Bamiyan province, after protesting against the Taliban's disregard for the rights of the Hazaras, went to his hometown of Balhab in northern Afghanistan's Saripul province and raised an armed uprising against the Taliban and fought them for several days. The Taliban sent huge forces to Balhab and forced Mawlawi Mahdi to flee the area. Recently there have been reports that Mahdi wanted to go to Iran, but the Taliban identified and destroyed him on the border with Iran. But there are other unconfirmed reports that Mawlawi Mahdi was arrested by Iranian border guards after entering Iran and then handed over to the Taliban.
In the photo: This is said to be one of the last photographs of Mawlawi Mahdi and proof that he is alive.
In fact, past experience shows that the only way for the non-Pashtun to survive is for these three ethnicities to unite and resist the oppressive rule of the Pashtuns. Of course, this is not only a matter of political power, but division and division among non-Pashtun ethnic groups will lead to the destruction of the culture, language, and historical identity of these ethnic groups, and they will face the risk of genocide, forced displacement, and systematic liquidation.
A prime historical example is the civil wars of the 1980s, when non-Pashtuns were pitted against each other, resulting in the Tajik government being weakened and replaced by a Pashtun-Taliban government. But when the non-Pashtun tribes united in an axis of resistance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud in the 1990s, the Taliban fell and were replaced by a democratic participatory government in which all ethnic groups participated.
However, as already mentioned, for many historical and political reasons, non-Pashtun ethnic groups have become dependent on various countries in the region to protect their identity, language, and culture from the aggressive approaches of the Pashtuns. At the same time, the Pashtuns turned out to be most dependent on Pakistan, Britain, the United States, and the Persian Gulf countries, the Hazaras - on Iran, and the Uzbeks - on Turkey. Of course, Iran and Russia also influenced the Tajiks to some extent, and now Tajikistan, which supported the Tajiks of Afghanistan, whose history requires a separate discussion.
But the difference between Pashtuns and Tajiks from Uzbeks and Hazaras is that the former fight for their interests regardless of the interests of their patrons, while the Uzbeks and Hazaras apparently do not have a definition of their own interests. One can only see that their interests become victims of the interests of their patrons.
However, in difficult historical periods, the Afghan ethnicities have always been at a crossroads. On the one hand, these are the demands of domestic policy in the context of ethnohistorical competitions and conflicts, and on the other hand, the interests of countries that support them.
Now, for example, Marshal Dostum, as the political representative of the Uzbeks, is faced with the fact that he must go to war against the Taliban in order to protect his ethnic, linguistic, and cultural values. But at the same time, he must inevitably submit to Turkey. However, Turkey is pursuing its own interests. She is more interested in interacting with the Taliban. The same with Iran. And Uzbeks and Hazaras become victims of these interactions.
