Now Kabulov is not Khalilzad and Russia is not the USA. Afghanistan is also not the Afghanistan of twenty years ago for Mr. Kabulov to talk about it on the basis of indicators from thirty years ago!
Author: Nurulla Valizada, analyst
1 - Kabulov is basically a Russian diplomat with Taliban leanings. He is part of a special circle of the Russian diplomatic apparatus that tends to cooperate between Russia and the West, and in the case of Afghanistan, the opinion of this circle is that the Taliban government should be supported if their opposition joins their government.
2 - Mr. Kabulov's recent statements, on closer inspection, reflect his departure from his former pro-Taliban stance. Previously, this Russian diplomat spoke out in support of the Taliban and did not even mention the name of the Resistance Front and its leadership, so as not to offend the Taliban. Now, as he lays out the reconciliation plan between the Taliban and the Front from the lips of the Taliban leaders, the reality is that the plan reflects Kabulov's own point of view. In fact, he is now convinced that resistance cannot be ignored and that a compromise plan should be devised.
3 - It should be conveyed to Mr. Kabulov that not now, but in the very first days of the formation of resistance, the Taliban were present and were ready to talk with his leadership. And they have hinted that they are ready to provide any public office that Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the Resistance Front, wishes, on the condition that he ceases resistance. The Taliban knew/know that resistance is no joke and sooner or later it will turn into a serious challenge to the unquestioned and nationwide rule of the group. The Taliban and their supporters knew that Ahmad Massoud's determination to fight was strong, and in this regard, he enjoyed wide public support and the support of some powerful and influential countries.
4 - If Mr. Kabulov does not know enough about the Taliban and the resistance movement, one should also draw his attention to the fact that the issues of disagreement between the resistance and the Taliban are not small and superficial, and cannot be resolved by giving one or more representative seats to the leaders of the Resistance Front in the ethnic and monogroup government of the Taliban. The issues at stake are very important. The Taliban move along a fascist ethnic line, and the resistance movement is a justice movement with deep historical, cultural, and ethnic roots and motives that cannot resolve differences without major changes in the power structure.
5 - Another point that Kabulov should know is that the Taliban are not a credible group. How can one negotiate with a terrorist group whose leader is unknown and it is not clear who holds the power? How do reach an agreement? And how to ensure the implementation of agreements? Maybe part of the Taliban is under the influence of Russia and Kabulov talks about negotiations based on their promises. But the Taliban is made up of different terrorist and intelligence groups, one group acting against another group. Pakistan will not allow the Taliban to follow an internal peace path. The intelligence services of Western countries also have their own influence and goals that impede national understanding. The positions of the peaceful Taliban are very weak and vulnerable. This is a strong reason for the unreliability of the Taliban.
6 - As the leader of the National Resistance Front recently put it, resistance to the Taliban does not depend on the presence of one person at the head of the leadership. Resistance is a folk-historical movement against ethnic tyranny that has centuries-old roots. If Ahmad Massoud stops resisting for any reason, the war and uprising against the Taliban regime will start from a different place and in a different form and continue.
That is, it should be emphasized once again that the problem is more fundamental than it can be solved with a superficial political approach. If this had not happened, then, given the weak position of the leadership of the Front in the last year, resistance in a number of provinces would not have continued. That is, resistance is largely an "unusual" reaction to a savage force claiming power. It is wrong to view the Resistance Front as a political party that was kicked out of the government due to political disagreements between the party leadership and the ruling party. This perception is wrong. It's true, that Ahmad Massoud played a fundamental and key role in the formation of the Second Resistance, and in his absence, resistance would have been formed with difficulty and later, but resistance to the cruel and despotic Taliban, whose oppression stems from ethnic considerations in a multi-ethnic society, is a natural phenomenon that follows explore separately. But in order to stop it, it is necessary to pay attention to the fundamental issues and problems of Afghanistan.
7 - Mr. Kabulov implicitly noted this popular and certainly Taliban point of view in his recent interview that Ahmad Massoud does not have the necessary credentials to be the leader of a powerful anti-Taliban military movement at the national level due to his lack of experience. Even if we do not accuse him of a pro-Taliban stance, his opinion is superficial. If you look closely, today the level of national and trans-ethnic expectations regarding Ahmad Massoud is much higher than the level of expectations that existed under Masoud Sr. at the national level. True, Masud the father was an iron man, tested and tempered in the crucible of war, but during his lifetime the situation in Afghanistan was such that as a result of civil (ethnic) wars, Afghan society was divided into several poles, and as a result, he was a hero and leader only for Tajiks, and other ethnic groups did not consider it as such. Later, after the martyrdom of Masood Sr., many realized that he was a unique national leader. In the case of Ahmad Massoud, there is now a national consensus that he can become a national and popular leader. This is something that Mr. Kabulov somehow missed.
8 - Another point is that resistance to the Taliban will continue even in the absence of foreign support. Perhaps Kabulov's idea is that now, given the relationship that the Russian diplomatic system has built with the Taliban, the Resistance front and its presence in Russia's sphere of influence has put Russia in a difficult position, and getting out of this situation requires pressure on the Front to put an end to the war with the Taliban. This perception may come from the fact that Russia is striving to form the model of cooperative government in Afghanistan that has existed for the past twenty years under US leadership. Let Mr. Kabulov understand that this view of his is also wrong. The experience of the last 20 years, when there is a national consensus and all ethnic groups gather around the axis of a centralized government, will not be repeated, and Russia can not transform its tense policy with the West on the territory of Afghanistan into a kind of cooperation to maintain some kind of peace. The formation of participatory government over the past twenty years under the leadership of the United States has been driven by two main internal and external factors, but these two factors do not exist now:
- An internal factor was the cessation of the resistance movement and non-Pashtun ethnic groups, demanding a change in the power structure. Although the resistance movement was considered the winner of the 2001 war, it abandoned its main claim, which was to change the centralized and mono-ethnic power structure. There are many reasons for this that need to be discussed separately. But this refusal led to the formation of a national consensus on the Pashtun power axis. In fact, the heirs of the first resistance failed were superficial, did not understand politics, were deceived, were afraid, were bribed, or for any other reason stopped the struggle to change the power structure. They put the Pashtuns in power and supported them so that Afghanistan could go its own way. Now the ball is on the Taliban/Pashtun side. They are not ready to give up their ethnic-authoritarian claims. If they do not yield, the yielding of others is unthinkable and impossible!
- The external factor was huge money and the military presence of the United States, which bribed and destroyed the internal consensus of opponents either with money or military force thus, in a few days, the semi-participatory order, with the participation of ethnic groups in a centralized power structure, lasted. Now, this factor has disappeared. Today, no foreign country is willing or able to play the US role in Afghanistan alone. Even the US is unwilling and unable to play this role in Afghanistan. The global and regional consensus on Afghanistan has also disappeared. Even Russia and China, the two major regional powers, are not prepared to spend as much money as the US in Afghanistan and settle internal disputes with money or force. Of course, it should be emphasized that solving disputes with money and force, if possible in the short term, is not possible in the long term.
9 - The following questions remain: Is Mr. Kabulov truly committed to solving the crisis in Afghanistan? Does Kabulov understand the problems of Afghanistan correctly? If we look at Kabulov's positions, often mirroring those of the Taliban, we can say that the answer to the last questions is not in the affirmative, and this is what made Kabulov unable to cross official diplomatic lines on the Afghan issue and achieve effective practical measures.
10 - It seems that Russian intelligence and Putin himself have a better understanding and approach to Afghanistan, and Kabulov better listen to them and not try to play the role of Khalilzad II in Afghanistan. Khalilzad was an Afghan Pashtun who sacrificed the chances of the Afghan people for progress for the sake of his ethnic views. Now Kabulov is not Khalilzad and Russia is not the USA. Afghanistan is also not the Afghanistan of twenty years ago for Mr. Kabulov to talk about it on the basis of indicators from thirty years ago!
