Islamabad in Afghanistan fell into the pit it had dug for itself.
Author: Kazim Humayuni, Analyst
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, its western border has always been the central axis of Islamabad’s national security and foreign policy. During the Cold War, the Pakistani army and intelligence services, supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia, pursued a policy based on backing Pashtun groups in Afghanistan. The goal of this strategy was to establish a friendly government in Kabul to contain India’s influence and secure what later became known as “strategic depth.”
In the 1990s, during the government of the late Professor Rabbani, General Pervez Musharraf said, “The rights of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan have been violated.” This statement reflected the prevailing mindset among Pakistan’s political and military elite—a view that saw the Pashtuns as the key to influence in Kabul and sought, through ethnic and religious ties, to reshape the regional balance in its favor.
However, the experience of the past two decades—especially the rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from within the same Pashtun society—changed Islamabad’s outlook. Pakistan realized that the very links which once served as instruments of power had turned into an internal threat to national security. The TTP insurgencies, internal pressures, and political legitimacy crises all forced Pakistan to reconsider its traditional doctrine toward Afghanistan.
Islamabad now understands that a Pashtun-centered policy brings neither stability nor lasting security. Therefore, the country’s military and security institutions are striving to promote a more balanced and multi-ethnic structure in Afghanistan—comprising Tajiks, Uzbeks, moderate Pashtuns, Hazaras, and other groups—to ensure equilibrium among regional interests.
This change in approach is essentially a response to Pakistan’s three historical concerns:
The Durand Line, which Islamabad believes can only be resolved in an atmosphere of national understanding, not ethnic confrontation.
Controlling the connection between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, which threatens the country’s internal security.
Establishing balance in Kabul’s relations with India to prevent direct and dangerous clashes between the two regional nuclear powers.
Today, Pakistan seeks neither Pashtun dominance nor the use of ideological factions, but a new path based on regional cooperation and an inclusive government in Afghanistan. This shift marks a transition from ethnopolitical geopolitics to the geopolitics of balance. If it continues, it could lift both Afghanistan and Pakistan out of the exhausting cycle of rivalry and guide them toward lasting regional stability and cooperation.
Conclusion:
Pakistan no longer strives for geographical depth in Afghan territory but seeks political depth through cooperation with its neighbors. If this pragmatic shift is managed wisely, it could mark the beginning of a new chapter in the turbulent history of the two nations.
