What Is the Hidden Game Between the Taliban and Pakistan?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
The recent display of “handing over 800 members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan to Islamabad” is a continuation of the same intelligence theater that has been unfolding for months between the Taliban and Pakistan—a theater whose aim is not to eliminate the threat, but to reshape it and manage external perceptions.
The claim of detaining and simultaneously transferring hundreds of militants is unlikely both operationally and from an intelligence standpoint, given the fragmented, mountainous, and complex structure of the TTP. The key question is: who exactly detained these individuals? How could such a large-scale operation take place without any information leaks, without resistance from the network, and without being detected by satellites? In reality, there is no evidence that the Taliban targeted the core infrastructure of the TTP; therefore, this transaction is more of a “performative gesture” than a genuine security operation.
Even assuming that some of these individuals were indeed handed over, the fundamental crisis persists. The TTP is active not only in the south and east; the group’s main dangerous and intelligence-driven segment is based in northern and northeastern Afghanistan, and the Taliban show no intention of dismantling this base. Eliminating several hundred people neither destroys the operational network nor reduces its capacity for influence. Moreover, this step may provoke reactions from other terrorist groups, since all of these networks breathe within a common “anti-Pakistani spirit” and share a unified ideological ecosystem in Afghanistan. Any selective deal between the Taliban and Islamabad makes these groups more suspicious, distrustful, and potentially more aggressive.
Meanwhile, the Taliban are attempting to present this move to the world as a gesture of “responsible governance” and “breaking free from dependence on Pakistan.” However, the reality is that Pakistan will never allow the Taliban to leave its intelligence orbit. If the Taliban truly handed over 800 TTP members, Pakistan—rather than becoming more trusting—is now worried that the Taliban may later transfer these strategic assets to other actors, especially Pakistan’s rivals. This is precisely where the hidden point of tension lies: Islamabad wants the threat under its own control, not under the control of the Taliban or anyone else.
The detention of several TTP members by the Taliban is more of a “staged operation” than a shift in policy. The Taliban have not targeted the core network; instead, by moving it away from the border, they are implementing a new plan: relocating the threat rather than eliminating it.
This policy allows the Taliban both to preserve the threat and deny it; to grant Pakistan tactical concessions while simultaneously presenting themselves at the regional level as having a “willingness to cooperate.” Pakistan is aware of this double game and, for this very reason, feels that the Taliban have gone beyond the quiet understandings reached in Doha and past intelligence arrangements, seeking a sudden expansion of their own independence.
Ultimately, this situation shows that the Taliban and Pakistan act within the same framework, yet with opposite aims: both inflate the threat and both fear it; both use the TTP as an instrument of pressure, and both pretend to be pursuing a resolution to the crisis. The Taliban rely on “security ambiguity” as a pillar of their strategic survival, while Pakistan turns to “controlled crisis-making” to win Western approval and reinforce its regional legitimacy.
What has just occurred is not a sign of real change, but part of the ongoing cycle of threat management. This cycle does not break the deadlock between the Taliban and Pakistan, nor reduce regional security risks, but merely repackages them in a new form and postpones them into the future.
