The blurring of the image of Iran as a special regional power is at the same time a means of constructing the image of the Taliban emirate as not only a geopolitical peer of Tehran but also a new center of power in the region.
Author: Andrey Serenko, Head of the Analytical Center of the Society of Political Scientists of Russia
ABOUT THE EVENTS ON MAY 27, 2023 ON THE IRAN-AFGHAN BORDER
1 - Despite the fact that there have been skirmishes between the Afghan Taliban and Iranian border guards before, the events of May 27 differ from them in a higher level of escalation and aggressiveness on the part of the Taliban.
2 - Yesterday's clash was not an unfortunate accident and the usual "quarrel of neighbors": the Taliban carried out an aggressive show of force, the purpose of which was to increase political pressure on Tehran (in particular, during the negotiation process on the "water problem" and on the issue of extradition of religious figures from Iranian Balochistan, who received asylum in the "emirate" of the Taliban). The fighting on May 27 showed the intention of the Taliban to pursue a comprehensive "negotiation-shootout" strategy in relations with Tehran.
3 - Such a strategy of the Taliban involves the gradual destruction of the image of Iran, its "humiliation/collapse" in the eyes of the countries of the region, and Muslim public opinion. Blurring the image of Iran as a special regional power is at the same time a means of constructing the image of the Taliban emirate as not only a geopolitical peer of Tehran but also a new center of power in the region, capable of forcing Iran to retreat and concede.
4 - These goals of the Taliban objectively coincide with the interests of Iran's geopolitical and regional opponents and competitors - the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. It cannot be ruled out that the special services of these states are involved in the implementation of the Taliban strategy of "overthrowing" Iran, which, perhaps, the Taliban emirate hopes to speed up the process of its external recognition by a number of Western and Arab states.
5 - Tehran will have to quickly develop a response strategy to the Taliban challenge. Until now, the Iranian leadership, which has no illusions about the terrorist nature of the Taliban regime, has tried to avoid a direct or hybrid military confrontation with it. The events of May 27 may force Tehran to reconsider this approach. Further escalation of tensions on the border, associated with demonstrations of force by the Taliban, will inevitably force Tehran to carry out a retaliation operation in order to avoid disastrous consequences for its state reputation and the regional balance of power.
6 - It seems more and more realistic that Tehran will move to more actively support the project of a hybrid war against the Taliban regime, which it can wage with the help of anti-Taliban resistance forces with the support of Tajikistan. There is information that the Iranian special services have already relaxed the ban on the training of anti-Taliban Resistance fighters located on the territory of Iran. In fact, we are talking about Tehran conducting a special military operation (SMO) against the Taliban in part of the territory of Afghanistan by the armed anti-Taliban resistance fighters.
7 - It is obvious that Tehran will try to avoid the "Shiiteization" of its SMO against the Taliban in order to prevent the confrontation from being interpreted as a "Shiites and Sunnis war." For Tehran, the image of a special military operation as a liberation struggle of Afghan patriots from among the former Afghan army soldiers against the tyranny of the occupying terrorists of the Taliban is optimal.
8 - An Iranian SMO against the Taliban is possible as early as late summer - autumn 2023. The timing of the operation will directly depend on the intensity of the Taliban provocations this summer and the implementation by the Taliban leaders of the strategy of destroying Iran's image.
