Mullah Omar was engaged in istikhara (seeking guidance by divination) and interpreting dreams.
Author: Wahid Mujda, a former official of the Foreign Ministry of the Taliban’s first government, author of the book Afghanistan and Five Years of Taliban Rule.
A few days before the start of the U.S. air strikes on Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammad Omar told his close associates: “You may regard my action as a sign of fear or cowardice, but I must send my family to Pakistan.”
Until then, the Taliban believed that even if Mullah Omar lacked other merits, he possessed at least two qualities: piety and bravery. By making that decision, however, Mullah Mohammad Omar showed the first sign of weakness.
Muttakkil, the foreign minister, met shortly before the strikes with an Iranian official at the Iranian border. That Iranian official told Muttakkil: “Leave the north, because you are extremely vulnerable there.”
When Muttakkil relayed this to the Taliban’s military commanders, most of them concluded that Iran was trying to present the “Northern Front” as a political pole of influence. At the same time, the Taliban believed they were capable of defending the north. The Taliban still did not trust Iran, even though the Iranian official—speaking out of genuine concern—had advised: “You do not have popular support in the north. Do not expose your fighters and the civilian population there to danger. It is better to concentrate your forces in Pashtun areas.”
Pakistan turned away from the Taliban, but thousands of Pakistanis from the tribal regions were ready to go to Afghanistan for “jihad” against America. They, like the Taliban, expected to fight U.S. soldiers face-to-face—until heavy bombardment began. Front lines across the country held for several weeks, but the pressure continued to mount.
In the north, after several weeks of intense strikes, the situation deteriorated. For that reason, a group of Pakistani volunteers was sent to Mazar-i-Sharif, but their problem was a complete unfamiliarity with the area.
Mullah Omar hoped that with the help of these Pakistani fighters, he could bolster the defenses in Mazar. In Kandahar, it was assumed that resistance would continue, but the repeated bombings gradually tightened the noose around Mullah Omar. He had to spend nights outdoors or in places where he had not been seen before. He avoided speaking over the radio himself so as not to reveal his location to the Americans.
Mullah Mohammad Omar remained officially the commander-in-chief of the Taliban forces, but in the context of a large-scale war he effectively had no contact with the fronts, fearing that his location would be uncovered and bombed. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s military commanders obeyed only his orders and no one else’s.
Mullah Nurullah Nuri, head of the northern zone, shouted over the radio: “We are being bombed from the air, the front lines near Mazar-i-Sharif are under ground attack, street fighting has begun in the city. Mullah-sahib (meaning Mullah Omar), tell me what to do?”
Mullah Akhtar Usmani, commander of the Taliban’s southern and western forces, after consulting Mullah Omar, replied: “You know the situation better. If the difficulties are great, consult others and decide.”
Nuri said, “I must speak personally with Mullah-sahib and hear the order from his own lips so that later I am not accused of cowardice and betrayal, like Mullah Mohammad Ghaus.”
Usmani answered: “We are not in contact with Mullah-sahib right now. Decide together with the other commanders.”
Other commanders also wanted to hear an order to retreat directly from Mullah Omar himself, but although he could hear them on the radio, he did not respond—until word came that U.S. aircraft had bombed the Tashqurghan gorge and the road was cut off. The road’s closure meant it was no longer possible to get from Mazar-i-Sharif to Pul-i-Khumri and then, via Bamiyan, reach Kabul.
The military commanders in Mazar held a council and ultimately decided to leave the city, as they could no longer withstand the powerful strikes of the American B-52 bombers.
While the danger of a popular uprising in the city was growing by the minute, news arrived that Bamiyan had fallen, and the roads connecting the north and south of the country were blocked. This news meant that all Taliban forces in the north were surrounded.
The Taliban feared the people more than anything else. They had never sought to gain popular support and knew that the population—having seen nothing from them but torture and oppression—was only waiting for the right opportunity to take revenge. Such is the inevitable fate of any regime that neglects the support of its own people.
Abu Hafs, a commander of al-Qaeda, was killed at the beginning of the bombings in the Chehilzina area near Kandahar. Juma Namangani, commander of foreign forces, was severely wounded in a U.S. airstrike on the Chashma-e Shama area in Mazar-i-Sharif and soon died in the hospital from his injuries. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others disappeared.
The retreat from Mazar-i-Sharif began at midnight and was extremely disorganized. There was no route other than the well-known Irganak path; they had to break through to Kunduz and join other forces stationed there. Everyone was focused solely on their own survival, while a group of Pakistani volunteers who had recently arrived in the city, unaware of the retreat, remained behind in Mazar-i-Sharif.
During this chaotic withdrawal, the Taliban suffered their heaviest losses of the entire war. From early morning until sunset, U.S. aircraft relentlessly bombed the trucks carrying Taliban fighters, their weapons, and rockets. At every step lay the wreckage of destroyed pickups and the mutilated bodies of fighters. Heat-seeking missiles targeted the engines of running vehicles, thereby immobilizing much of the Taliban’s forces.
The scale of this massacre was enormous, and only a few managed to reach Kunduz. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif marked the beginning of their overall collapse throughout Afghanistan, as opposition forces captured city after city.
In Kandahar, Mullah Omar was still engaged in istikhara and interpreting dreams. He told his associates: “Do not surrender, for America will be destroyed in just a few days!” But the expected destruction of America was delayed, while Kandahar itself was on the brink of disaster.
With each passing day, the number of Mullah Omar’s supporters dwindled, and eventually he was forced to abandon his illusions and declare his readiness to surrender Kandahar. He made this decision after his units, sent to recapture Uruzgan Province, were destroyed by U.S. airstrikes along the way.
With the fall of Kandahar, the “Islamic Emirate” established by the Taliban completely collapsed.
