Pashtun leaders have turned the issue of power into a matter of honor and dignity and have caused ethnic nervousness in society, and they are convinced that if power is in the hands of a Pashtun or a Pashtun family, then it is good, if not, then let there be war and destruction.
Author: Yaqub Yasna, analyst, university professor.
For several hundred years, power in Afghanistan has been in the hands of a number of Pashtun families. But within a few decades, their dominance collapsed and declined. This break and decline are due to the traditional family government structure of the Pashtun leaders because the traditional family government is ineffective in today's world. After the reign of Zahir Shah, the family governments of the Pashtun people faltered and fell into decay.
The people of Afghanistan were supposed to move from traditional rule to popular and democratic rule, but, unfortunately, this transition did not happen because the Pashtun leaders turned the issue of power into a matter of honor and dignity and have caused ethnic nervousness in society, and they are convinced that if power is in the hands of a Pashtun or a Pashtun family, then it is good, if not, then let there be war and destruction.
Over the past 20 years, we could have moved from traditional rule to a democratic political system, but the ethnic nervousness of power has not strengthened democratic institutions, Karzai handed over Ghani's government and Ghani to the Taliban.
If so, what is the problem of the Tajik people or specifically the Tajik leadership? In my opinion, in these few decades, the two main parties to the power game in Afghanistan are the Pashtun and Tajik leaders, and most of the power is somehow divided between the leaders of these two ethnic groups. Hazaras and Uzbeks were present in the game, but they were mainly involved in the power game between Pashtun and Tajik leaders, who used the help of these two ethnic groups to step up their game.
The position of the Pashtun leaders is clear, in any case, they believe that the power and rule belong to the Pashtun people. But the position of the Tajik leaders is not clear, although they want power, but they have not had a clear and consistent position, especially in the last twenty years. After the fall of Najib's government, most of the power was in the hands of the Tajiks. At the head of the Tajik government were Ustad Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud. When the Taliban came on the scene, power passed to a number of Pashtuns and international terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. But at the Bonn Conference, Tajik leaders regained their place in power and government.
At first, except for Karzai, all power and key ministries were in the hands of the Tajik leaders. But they gradually lost their power in internecine competition and even made a deal against each other with Karzai and Ghani, and most importantly, someone as a political figure in several rounds of the presidential elections entered the election campaigns on behalf of the Tajik people but did not have decisiveness in politics. That person was Dr. Abdullah. Another person who hammered the final nail into the coffin of the Tajik power was Amrullah Saleh. He was so engrossed in the chair and power that he didn't even understand the reality or problems around him and thought that the size of the power was equal to the size of the chair he was sitting on. But we should not forget that Marshal Fahim was in charge of managing power among the Tajiks. He sacrificed the interests of the Tajiks for the sake of his own interests. It was with his help that Karzai removed a number of Tajik leaders from power. If the Tajik leaders had played clearly and harmoniously, the balance of power would have been established, but their personal game and desire for wealth led to the exclusion of the Tajik people from the game for power in Afghanistan.
I consider the fall of the previous government a catastrophic failure of the Tajik leadership and the Tajik people. Because during these decades, efforts were made to create an ethnic balance in political power and governance. Tajik leaders have played a colorful role in power since Bonn, but due to their carelessness, that power has diminished in the last twenty years until they were completely excluded from the power game with the arrival of the Taliban. The fact that the Tajik leaders were removed from power was due to the negligence, disunity, and bargaining of the Tajik leaders themselves.
In the event of defeat, it is a relatively common rule that the social and political leaders of the defeated nation usually put aside their pre-defeat differences and unite. But, interestingly, this rule did not apply to Tajik leaders. While they all fled to other countries, their conflict has increased from what it was before the defeat, and each of them says that I am the leader, and everyone claims to be the leader. These leadership claims are painful and laughable. This is painful for the whole people and ridiculous for the Tajik leaders, who own neither the land nor the population but claim leadership.
It would be right and appropriate for them to learn from this defeat, sit down together and consider what the mistakes and problems of their past were and how they can overcome their conflicts. Because past conflicts ended with the fall of the previous government and the discourse of power and bargaining has changed. In the current situation, another reality and discourse have been formed, which should fit in with the existing reality and discourse.
Some might say that the Hazaras and Uzbeks will not join the Tajiks. My point is that if Tajik political and social leaders overcome their problems and conflicts, the prospects for politics and power in Afghanistan will be relatively clear, and stability will be formed in the power game. If the Tajik leaders do not overcome their problem, Amrullah, and ... do not sacrifice political relations for nervousness and personal emotions, then there will be no prospects for a stable game in politics and power.
