Russia is trying to resume mediation for reconciliation between the Taliban and its opponents.

Author: Ahmad Saidi, an analyst on Afghanistan and regional issues (Germany), especially for Sangar

At the end of November, a meeting of opponents of the Taliban was held in the capital of Russia, Moscow, organized by the A Just Russia party, which occupies about 20% of the seats in the parliament of this country.

Although the Russian Foreign Ministry did not play any role in the anti-Taliban meeting in Moscow, the fact that the Russian government allowed such a meeting for a political party serving in that country's parliament shows that the Russian government has a positive view of the anti-Taliban. There have even been analyses in the media and media circles indicating a change in the approach and position of the Russian government towards the Taliban after this meeting.

However, less than a month after this meeting, the special representative of the Russian President Zamir Kabulov visited Kabul. During this trip, Kabulov met and spoke with several prominent Taliban government officials, including Amirkhan Muttaqi, acting foreign minister, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, a prominent Taliban leader and acting interior minister. From such pendulum movements of Russia, the question arises, what is Russia looking for in Afghanistan and why is this country pursuing a “neither fish nor fowl” policy towards Afghanistan?

Russia's instrumental use of Taliban opponents. Three analyses can be presented to answer this question. The first analysis is that Russia has not yet decided what to do with Afghanistan.

Russia has indeed established close and informal relations with the Taliban, but it is unclear in which direction the Taliban will ultimately move.

Therefore, while simultaneously establishing close relations with the Taliban, it did not take his eyes off the Taliban's opponents. In other words, Russia is using opponents of the Taliban as a tool to put pressure on the Taliban.

The Russian pendulum movement shows that this country does not have the necessary confidence and trust in the Taliban and to force the Taliban to fulfill its demand, before sending its special representative to Kabul, it held a meeting with the opponents of the Taliban.

Russia's appeasement of the Taliban. The second analysis is that after the above-mentioned meeting, Russia sent a special envoy to Kabul to pacify and calm the Taliban.

Russian President Vladimir Putin knows that the Taliban opposition does not have the necessary potential to become an effective tool, and is not an effective playing card in the Afghan equation, so why would it drive the Taliban from Moscow by simply holding a show meeting that could mean support?

Therefore, by sending its special representative to Kabul, Moscow sought to distance the Taliban's negative view from Russia due to the scale of the opposition meeting in Kabul. According to this analysis, by sending his special envoy to Kabul, Putin showed that he never had hostile intentions toward the Taliban and that the event had nothing to do with the Russian government's official policy towards Afghanistan.

Russia and mediation between the Taliban and the opposition. The third analysis is that Russia's goal in holding the Taliban opposition meeting is reconciliation between the Taliban and the opposition.

This analysis can be seen as the dominant analysis when it is important to note an important point: although the Taliban's opponents have the necessary capabilities to use this tool, it would be disadvantageous to use it against the Taliban.

The Russians are fully aware of this problem: if the security situation in Afghanistan is disrupted and the current relative stability is lost, the future situation, if beneficial to any country, will not be beneficial to Russia and its neighboring countries (Central Asia).

Therefore, Russia is trying to resume mediation efforts for reconciliation between the Taliban and its opponents by reactivating the Moscow format.

It is not far off that after hosting the Taliban opposition, Russia conveyed the message and demands of the Taliban opposition to Kabul through its representative and tried to mediate between the two sides.


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