Washington Turned Its Enemies into Pawns of the Game
Author: Kazim Homayun, analyst
In 1984, the United States government established a program called “Rewards for Justice,” a project whose official goal was to collect information to prevent terrorist attacks and punish their perpetrators. Since its inception, the U.S. State Department has paid over $150 million to its informants through this program.
However, now, more than four decades later, the true face of this program has emerged from behind the mask of justice. What once began as a security measure has today evolved into a multifaceted instrument of Washington’s foreign policy—a tool for bargaining, exerting pressure, controlling resources, and even protecting those officially designated as adversaries.
Offering a reward for supporting or eliminating a specific individual is not always intended as a “hunt.” Sometimes the goal is to test influence and assess the security of intelligence networks. When the U.S. State Department sets a reward of $10, $20, or $25 million, it is not a sign of ignorance, but an effort to determine who else possesses information about the target’s position.
A clear example is Osama bin Laden. The New York Times reported on May 20, 2011, that the U.S. government, long before the Abbottabad operation, was using RQ-170 drones and intelligence networks in Pakistan, and knew the location of his hideout. However, until complete certainty was achieved, groups like the Taliban or Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) did not have access to this information and took no action. In fact, the $25 million reward for bin Laden was less a promise to the public and more a tool for Washington to test the flow of intelligence.
Another example is the case of Mullah Mohammad Omar. The New York Times revealed on March 9, 2015, that the Taliban leader had lived for years in Afghanistan’s Zabul province, near a U.S. base, effectively under indirect American protection. At the same time, the U.S. State Department had set a $10 million reward for his capture. This report showed that the goal of the reward was not physical elimination but control and concealment of a figure whose existence was significant for the balance of power in Afghanistan.
A third figure is Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Interior Minister. The BBC reported on March 12, 2025, that after the release of two American citizens by the Taliban, the previously set $10 million reward for Haqqani was canceled. This decision sent a clear message: in Washington’s political framework, justice is not a fixed concept but a tool for negotiation and the allocation of advantages.
According to official data, the U.S. has paid over $150 million in rewards since the program’s inception; however, independent investigations, including studies by the Propablica Research Center, indicate that within this same framework, more than $700 million in assets associated with these figures were seized. These figures provide a clear picture of the program’s hidden profitability: a project that outwardly presents itself as justice and security, but in reality functions as a precise mechanism for information control, scenario management, and even securing economic interests.
In this context, figures such as bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, each once portrayed as an absolute enemy, were transformed on the political chessboard into pawns of American intelligence.
Ultimately, in the game of power, the real enemies are not defined on the battlefield but at negotiation tables. And justice is merely a mask that legitimizes this game.
