The Taliban invasion of Khorasan is an invasion of the pan-Arab narrative. Taliban have a different definition for Turks, Tajiks, and Hazaras, and even Pashtun intellectuals do not fit their definition of religious extremism.
Author: Najib Barwar
The life of the Prophet as a religious matter is another matter, and the events in the Islamic world after his death to this day are of a political nature. Even the Orientalists separated the Islam of the Prophet's time from political Islam.
The problem starts when the succession war starts. According to some oral reports, the Shia Imam Ali claims that the Prophet appointed him as his successor. This causes Omar to intervene. Omar appoints Abu Bakr as caliph by force of the sword, so that the caliphate of political Islam will follow in accordance with the traditional hierarchy. The Prophet's family protests from the very beginning and disputes begin.
Among the four caliphs, a narrative about Umar's axis is emerging, seeking to politicize Islam. This narrative is strengthened day by day, and during the caliphate of Umar, there is a clear manifestation of militarism. When the religious guise of Islam is accompanied by a sword and strength, the Prophet's family protests and describes the actions of the second caliph as contrary to the values of their ancestor.
These wars and confrontations continued until the caliphate of Uthman and Ali, and in one of the wars, Aisha also fought against Ali. Imam Husayn is also killed in Karbala on the basis of this desire for value because he believes that the manner of Yazid's caliphate is contrary to the principles of Muhammad's religion.
The Iranians, who have an independent and civilized narrative in the region, were defeated by the Arab invasion of their land after long wars. It becomes difficult and impossible to resist the invasion of various peoples in the name of Islam.
The Iranians are flexible and use the Arab dispute to their advantage and support the position of the Prophet's family. This covert defense later became apparent, leading to the formation of Shia Islam as an equal discourse against the Arabs. Note in history that Iranian mourning for Hussein is similar to their mourning for Siavash and other heroes and myths of history.
Shia Islam is gradually taking root in such a way that, together with the Arab political narrative, it opens up space and forces Iranian culture and language to survive under the shadow of this security belt. Like the Arab currents, the Iranian current also stems from Islam, since two of the four centers of Islamic thought are located in Qom and Najaf.
Of course, along with the Shiite issue, cultural and national contradictions also take root. The resistance of Abu Muslim and Yaqub Lays was also a protest against the Arab political invasion, which was under the name Mohammad's Islam came with aggression and violence.
When the Arabs understand the religious approach of the Iranians to Islam, from then on they started issuing political fatwas. They call the Shiite trend Rafidi, and the Iranian culture Majus. The Iranian-Arab war has continued throughout history, and in recent history, in addition to the enmity of the pan-Arab states, terrorist groups have also been created on the axis of confrontation and enmity with the Shiites and Persian culture.
Following the policy of the Arabs, the Taliban invaded Khorasan and overthrew the first Tajik government that came to power three hundred years later. But ISIS, a pan-Arab sect with direct support from the West, is targeting Shiite political geography.
Some people ask, when both the Taliban and the Tajiks are Sunnis in Afghanistan, what is their problem? The main problem is that Khorasanian Tajiks are followers of Imam Abu Hanifa. Abu Hanifa is the founder of Khorasan Islam and there is a soft struggle against the politics of the Arabs. In this regard, Abu Hanifa allowed praying in Persian, because there is a very significant connection between the Shiites and Khorasan Islam, which is understood by religious scholars. In Khorasanian Islam, Bu Ali, Rumi, and Farabi thought in the same way as Iranian Shiites thought. And the Taliban are followers of extremist Wahhabism, the foundations of which were laid in the pan-Arab countries.
The Taliban do not accept Shiites and Khorasani Islam. For them, Amanullakhan is a ghazi (winner), and Ahmad Shah Massoud's struggle against USSR, since it is based on Khorasanian Islam, is of no value. The Taliban invasion of Khorasan is an invasion of the pan-Arab narrative. Taliban have a different definition for Turks, Tajiks, and Hazaras, and even Pashtun intellectuals do not fit their definition of religious extremism. Enmity with the Shiites, Tajiks, Turks, and Khazaras, enmity with the Persian language, and Iranian culture is a pan-Arab feud that has an exact and very clear direction.
From this point of view, Talib and ISIS are children of the same mother and share a common history. According to what I said, study the Taliban, then you will understand how thin the line is between the invasion of the Taliban and the invasion of the Arab caliphates. The people of Khorasani will not, under any circumstances, submit to this proxy group.
Khorasan historically does not accept aggression and slavery, and our weapons will not be laid down as long as the Taliban exist in the region. It is time for today's generation of Afghanistan, based on national discourse, to remove this stigma of history from their homeland. There is no word of surrender in our rebellious imagination!
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Sangar’s editorial policy.
