On April 18, I wrote a note about the Taliban's exclusion from the federal list of terrorist organizations in Russia. This test was published on the website of the weekly "Farazh." I present to you the author's version of the note in Russian.
Author: Sherali Rizoiyon, political scientist (Tajikistan)
Photo: "We are no longer terrorists. Here is a certificate," - a cartoon from Russian media.
A feature of the modern world order is the return to "realpolitik", where many previously relevant standards (traditions and customs, international law, "unwritten laws", etc.), the formation of public opinion, the creation of narratives, etc. no longer matter (however, before they de facto did not matter, but compliance with these norms was constantly repeated and imitated). Today, the main criterion is national interests, which, depending on the development of the situation, acquire their new interpretation. From this perspective, let us consider the evolution of Russia's attitude towards the Taliban.
On April 17, the Supreme Court of Russia permitted the activities of the Taliban movement on the territory of this country (i.e., the ban on Taliban activity in the Russian Federation was suspended) and excluded them from the federal list of terrorist organizations. From this moment on, the Taliban can legally operate on the territory of Russia.
Thus, Russia's approach to the Taliban reflects the well-known Persian wisdom: "either by force, or by begging, or by gold":
The stage of forceful pressure on the Taliban covers the period from the emergence of this movement until 2012. A characteristic feature of this period was the widespread dissemination of negative narratives around the Taliban, designating them as the number one threat to the security of Russia's southern borders, especially to the security of Central Asian countries.
The stage of "begging" or seeking the favor of the Taliban covers the period from 2013 to April 17 of this year. The characteristic features of this period are the beginning of negotiations with the Taliban on the eve of the announcement of the withdrawal of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) forces in 2014; the launch of the Moscow format on Afghanistan; the continuation of the formation of negative narratives around the Taliban until 2019 (from 2020 to 2024, the frequency of the formation of these narratives in relation to the Taliban decreased annually); the construction of positive narratives about the Taliban (a series of statements and interviews by Zamir Kabulov and Dmitry Zhirnov after August 2021); the creation of a positive image of the Taliban in the media space; extolling the Taliban as a partner in the fight against terrorist groups, especially ISIS-Khorasan; establishing economic and trade cooperation with the Taliban; entering the Afghan market, etc.
The "gold" stage or economic incentives for the Taliban officially began on April 18 this year, but in fact, since 2013, and it is unknown how long it will last. Based on the analysis of Russia's previous experience, the following may be characteristic of this period:
- Expansion of trade and economic cooperation with the Taliban, investments in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, active participation of Russia in trans-Afghan transport and transit projects, or the launch of new such projects, etc.
- Giving new dynamics to the Moscow format on Afghanistan, which serves as a resource for both Russia's foreign policy and the Taliban (in practice, this may facilitate the Taliban's exit from international isolation);
- Minimization of negative narratives about the Taliban in the media space. Some Russian experts are engaged in constructing negative narratives about the Taliban in the media space. Before the Taliban was removed from the federal list of terrorist organizations, it seemed that their actions were aimed at “calming the passions” of the external audience (especially in Central Asia) and playing with the Taliban resistance forces. What will they do now: change their position or continue their previous activities? (continuation of such activities, given the peculiarities of the Russian political system, is unlikely, unless this is a controlled “project” or a tool for playing with public opinion in the countries of Central Asia and the Taliban opposition forces);
- Broad media support for the activities of the Taliban and increased formation of their positive image (what was observed after August 2021 will become even more widespread).
- An increasingly widespread presentation of the Taliban as a partner in the fight against terrorist groups, especially ISIS-Khorasan (this has already been observed before, and now it will become systemic and may be included in the text of "joint statements" of organizations under the patronage of Russia).
Perhaps, a domestic reader may ask: "Why do we care about all this, because this is Russia's approach, and we are a different and independent country?" The question is appropriate, and I wrote all this to learn a lesson from it.
In my opinion, we must stop believing in various myths, look at the world with our own eyes, protect the stability and security of our country, and strive to realize our own national interests. Because NO ONE will think about us except ourselves.
