If the countries of Central Asia are really concerned about their collective security, they should distance themselves from the Taliban and take serious practical steps to support the northern forces. Thus, they will get rid of what is called the spread of the threat of terrorism to Central Asia.
Author: Nurulla Valizade, writer and political commentator, especially for Sangar
On July 17, 2017, party leaders Junbesh, Jamiat, Wahdat and Ittihad, led by Sayyaf, gathered in Turkey, along with several other political organizations ousted by Ghani's monopoly, gathered in Turkey and established an "Afghan Salvation Coalition High Council" around Marshal Dostum. The council took no effective action other than a few statements in reaction to Ghani's repressive and monopolistic behavior and it was eventually forgotten.
Now, on May 19, 2022, the same parties, along with several other political parties and movements ousted and ousted by the Taliban, again established the High Council of the Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan in Turkey and again around Marshal Dostum.
If we look at the name of the High Council of the Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan, the only difference is that "resistance" has replaced "coalition". The High Council of the Coalition to Save Afghanistan has been renamed the High Council of the Resistance to Save Afghanistan!
The reasons and motives for the formation of the High Council of the Resistance are the same as the reasons and motives for the creation of the High Council of the Coalition. In terms of membership, there is no significant difference between the one and the other.
As you can see, the Supreme Council of the Coalition has achieved nothing. Can the High Council of the Resistance achieve something?
The following five main factors are believed to have contributed to the collapse of the Afghan Salvation Coalition High Council, which was formed in 2017:
1 - Lack of commitment of Council members to mutual unity and solidarity;
2 - Selfishness and desire for the position of political leaders forming a coalition;
3 - The presence of distrust and suspicion of members to each other, which existed from the distant past between the parties and political movements that were part of the coalition;
4 - Elementary weakness of the members of the coalition against the temptations and conspiracies of the Ghani government;
5 - Dependency of the Salvation Coalition High Council from outside interventions, especially Turkish intervention.
Now the question is, has the Supreme Council of the Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan, given the similarity of causes and motives, goals and composition of members, taken precautions against the potential dangers that the aforementioned factors may pose for this council?
After the formation of the Supreme Council of the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, it was seen that Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, both at the internal and external levels, began efforts to dismantle the coalition.
On an internal level, Ghani began secret negotiations with each of the council members, promising them that any benefits they ask for would be granted to them. However, the promised benefits were often not kept. Abroad, Ghani contacted Turkey, Uzbekistan and several other countries to remove the barrier of foreign support for the Council by providing them with benefits.
Even now, the Taliban, who take the advice of Ghani and Karzai in such cases, will begin efforts to dismantle the Supreme Council of the Resistance. Signs of these efforts are the creation of a "Contact Committee" to communicate with political opponents of the Taliban abroad, an attempt to form a Loya Jirga, secret and open negotiations of the Taliban with Turkey and some other countries. What will be the result of these efforts depends on what lessons the board members have learned from the past and to what extent these lessons are reflected in preventive measures.
If we look at the first declaration of the Supreme Council of the Resistance to Save Afghanistan, there are not many encouraging signs in it. This declaration does not show a serious, unified, persistent and purposeful step. Instead of acting as a party to the conflict with the Taliban, it treats issues as an impartial arbiter and calls on the Taliban to enter into negotiations with the Council. He also calls on the international community and the United Nations to put pressure on the Taliban. The position of the Council in the Declaration is more like that of a few human rights defenders or war victims. The tone of the declaration is neutral and does not indicate the possibility of tough steps against the Taliban. The declaration makes no mention of the serious and irreversible commitment of Council members to maintaining unity and solidarity among members.
It seems that the council met involuntarily, under pressure and coercion, and not so much due to the internal motivation of the members, and accepted the declaration out of desperation so that its meeting would not seem insignificant. The declaration begins with probabilities and doubts. Gives priority to dialogue with the Taliban, who are not people of dialogue and members of the Council understand this very well. Over the past nine months, the members have individually had personal, indirect and covert contacts with the Taliban in order to be given a share in the government. These people said the same thing nine months ago, that the situation would get worse if the Taliban did not form an inclusive government (if they did not give a share to the members of the Council). Now the same thing was said in the declaration of the Council and was said at the very beginning.
It seems that the High Council of the Resistance, as in the past, primarily depends on the decisions of Turkey.
Turkey is one of the countries with close ties to the Taliban, and over the past nine months it has consistently sought to convince them to accept a number of Turkish proteges into its administration. These efforts seem to have failed, so Turkey has decided to bring members of the Resistance High Council to Save Afghanistan into game to use as leverage against the Taliban. This is in fact the most important vulnerability of this Council.
The question is, if tomorrow Turkey, for some reason, compromises with the Taliban and refuses to “create coalitions” against this group, what will happen to the Council? Is this Council able to maintain cohesion to the extent that it can continue to work despite Turkey's unwillingness to support it and take purposeful and united steps to fight the Taliban? The answer to this question is no, given past experience. Otherwise, we should wait, time will tell!
But in addition to pessimism, the political parties and movements that is part of the Supreme Council of Resistance for Salvation are the most influential powers in the events in northern Afghanistan and have valuable experience in the fight against the Taliban. The unification of these parties and currents is a strategic initiative, but, as already mentioned, maintaining their unity is a difficult task. Experience shows that in the majority of cases these parties strive for rapprochement, which immediately leads to disintegration. These parties know that they are always in danger of repression and destruction by the totalitarian forces of the South, but it seems that this danger was never taken so seriously by them and could not lead them invincible alliance. Of course, as already mentioned, one of the factors in the failure of their union is external, and Turkey plays a destructive role in this. Turkey has its eye on the Afghan Uzbeks and certainly prefers to position itself as the decision-making center for the political future of the Afghan Uzbeks.
Turkey sometimes advises the Junbish party and Marshal Dostum, now the recognized representative of the Uzbeks of Afghanistan, to form a coalition with non-Pashtun forces that are in opposition and fight for justice, and sometimes advises to team up with totalitarian and authoritarian Pashtun politicians. This game is very detrimental to the justice movement in Afghanistan and prevents the formation of a strong opposition movement in the north.
Turkey seems to understand that the Uzbeks in Afghanistan do not claim political power, but their "big claims" along with the powerful Tajik and Hazara parties will be enough to give the Uzbeks their fair share of power, whether in the Pashtun government or in the non-Pashtun justice movement.
In fact, Turkey draws inspiration from the concept of “getting good, but also not getting good” about the role of Uzbeks in Afghan politics. In other words, to strengthen and protect the Uzbeks and put them in the ranks of the struggle of the strong political currents of the north for justice and thus elevate the Uzbeks in the Afghan government and politics is good, but if not, then another opportunity appears - to receive benefits from the government, and in any case, the government will be ready to give the Uzbeks a share that will be commensurate with their role and numbers.
Turkey knows that the Pashtuns do not see the Uzbeks as a credible and serious threat. In fact, the main struggle for power in Afghanistan is between Tajiks and Pashtuns. Uzbeks and Hazaras individually do not pose a threat to the Pashtuns. They become a danger to the Pashtuns when they team up with the Tajiks. The Turks are well aware of these issues and have built their games around this understanding in recent decades. They form a coalition of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara parties and then contact the Pashtuns and ask for a share for the Uzbeks of Afghanistan and for themselves. If the Pashtuns gave a share - and they gave a lot - great, but if not, Turkey is trying to strengthen the northern alliance against the Pashtun authorities.
As already noted, the union of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara parties is a means of saving them from the program of extermination and repression that the Pashtun rulers have consistently pursued over the past hundred years. However, the intervention of an external factor has weakened and ruined the unity of the non-Pashtun peoples and parties of the North, caused a loss of trust between them, and this is the biggest blow to them. If these forces are allowed to unite in the face of an internal threat directed against their peoples and constantly work to maintain unity, the scroll of tyranny, monopoly and Pashtun fascism, now intertwined with national and international terrorism, will be tangled.
It is interesting to note that when the Afghan Salvation Coalition was formed in Turkey four years ago, it spoke of the rise of ISIS and other terrorist groups in the north as a serious threat, stating that if local forces in the north did not unite, Northern Afghanistan would become a war zone. actions and will pose a serious threat to Central Asia. Now this threat has become more serious than before, given that the Taliban have lost control of the country as an ally and collaborator of ISIS, and this threat is actually directed more at the countries of Central Asia.
Therefore, one can say that if the countries of Central Asia are really concerned about their collective security, they should distance themselves from the Taliban and take serious practical steps to support the northern forces. Thus, they will get rid of what is called the spread of the threat of terrorism to Central Asia. This is being done by strengthening the National Resistance Front and the High Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan.
Of course, this requires serious and frank negotiations with Turkey so that it refrains from dangerous multilateral games, some of which was planned in NATO cabinets, and the other part claims to be friends with the oppressed peoples of Afghanistan. In fact, unless the countries of Central Asia cut off Turkey's hand in building alliances in the north, the danger will not be easily eliminated.
