A Political Analysis of the Origins, Nature, and Rise of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland — AfD)
Author: Fayaz Bahraman Najimi, analyst on regional and international affairs and member of the Sangar Advisory Council
Since the late twentieth century, the traditional boundaries between the political left and right have gradually begun to shift. Eric Hobsbawm, the eminent Marxist historian, was among those who recognized earlier than many others the crisis of the classical concept of the nation-state and the changing role of nationalism. In his later works, he demonstrated that nationalism could no longer be understood through the same concepts used to explain it in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the one hand, nation-states came under pressure from supranational forces such as globalization and international institutions; on the other, they faced demands of a subnational, ethnic, and regional character.
Political developments in the twenty-first century have shown that this transformation has not been limited to the crisis of the nation-state alone. The traditional boundaries between left and right have also become increasingly blurred in many societies. Movements have emerged that, in the economic and social spheres, embrace some demands traditionally associated with the left — such as protecting the lower social strata, social welfare, public services, and opposition to the power of global capital — while at the same time adopting positions on nationhood, migration, borders, and political sovereignty that are closer to the nationalist right. Thus, twenty-first-century politics has moved beyond the simple framework of “left versus right” to a greater extent than before.
This transformation can be observed in political forces and figures such as Donald Trump in the United States, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally (Rassemblement National — RN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland — AfD) in Germany. These forces are, of course, not identical in terms of their history, structure, or political programs. What primarily unites them is their ability to connect a degree of social and economic discontent with the defense of the nation, national sovereignty, and borders, as well as with opposition to certain aspects of the globalized order. Their rise, therefore, cannot be explained solely by the spread of any single ideology; rather, it should be understood in the context of changing relations between society and existing political structures.
The Alternative for Germany — AfD — likewise cannot be explained by a single, simplistic label. It would be inaccurate to regard it merely as a conventional conservative and nationalist party, but it would be equally inaccurate to identify the party as a whole with National Socialism and historical fascism. At the same time, denying the existence of far-right, racist, and ethnocentric currents within the party would also be inconsistent with the political realities of contemporary Germany.
The Alternative for Germany — AfD — was founded in 2013 by a group of economists, university professors, and conservatives who opposed the policies aimed at rescuing the euro and the broader direction of the European Union. Initially, the party was predominantly a Eurosceptic conservative movement with a strong commitment to liberal economic principles and a demand that some decision-making powers in economic affairs be returned to the nation-state. Over time, however, its agenda changed. Particularly after the 2015 migration crisis, migration and asylum became central issues in the party’s political platform, while nationalist and far-right forces significantly strengthened their influence within the party. As a result, AfD evolved from a primarily Eurosceptic party into a right-wing populist political force, with openly far-right tendencies gaining considerable strength in some sections of the party. Political research in Germany has also documented this transformation.
The central question concerning AfD, therefore, is not whether the party should be described as “good” or “bad.” A far more important question is how a party with such origins managed, within a relatively short period, to become one of the most influential forces on the German political right, and why it has gained particularly broad support in several regions of eastern Germany. Understanding this phenomenon does not imply sympathy for AfD; on the contrary, it is a necessary condition for properly understanding the party and, consequently, for responding to it effectively.
One common mistake in this debate is to equate every form of nationalism or conservatism with fascism. Historical fascism was a specific phenomenon with distinctive historical, ideological, and organizational characteristics; therefore, not every right-wing movement can be equated with fascism simply because of its nationalist orientation. At the same time, making this distinction should not be interpreted as denying the existence of far-right tendencies within AfD. Certain sections of the party display ethnonationalist and xenophobic views, as well as conceptions of national belonging based on culture and ancestry. Some party figures have also used concepts and expressions with historical roots in the far-right tradition.
Thus, describing AfD as a right-wing populist party with strong far-right currents appears more accurate than either of two extreme interpretations: the first, which labels the entire party as fascist, and the second, which denies the presence of far-right forces within it. This distinction also makes it possible to separate criticism of a political movement from an understanding of the social causes that have contributed to its growing influence.
Part of AfD’s strength lies in the fact that the new right no longer follows the economic model of the traditional right. Alongside nationalism and a hard-line approach to migration, it advances demands that in the past were more commonly associated with left-wing political rhetoric: support for families, reducing the cost of living, affordable housing, rebuilding schools and infrastructure, strengthening public services, and supporting disadvantaged regions. Opposition to the power of global capital and criticism of economic elites also occupy an important place in the discourse of the new right.
This combination does not mean that AfD is, for example, a left-wing party. On the contrary, it is necessary to distinguish between a party’s social policies and its overall position within the political system. What matters is how social demands are combined with the party’s views on the nation, migration, the state, culture, borders, and the relationship between citizens and foreigners. It is precisely this new combination that has shaped some of the defining features of the politics of the new right.
The crisis of traditional parties is another important factor behind the growth of such movements. In many Western liberal democracies, established parties no longer represent particular classes and social groups as clearly as they once did. Globalization, the movement of capital, migration, cultural change, and the expansion of supranational institutions such as the European Union have created a sense among parts of society that the most important decisions affecting their lives are being made somewhere far removed from them. When citizens begin to feel that elections bring no meaningful change to their lives, while traditional parties no longer represent their interests or speak a language they can relate to, fertile ground emerges for the rise of new political forces.
In such circumstances, populism becomes an effective instrument for transforming social discontent into political power. “Ordinary people” are set against “political, economic, and cultural elites,” and a party capable of presenting itself as the voice of those who feel ignored can attract a significant protest vote. Similar conditions have contributed to the emergence or strengthening of new political movements in various European countries and in the United States. AfD should therefore be understood as part of a broader transformation of Western politics rather than as a phenomenon detached from developments in France, Italy, or the United States.
At the same time, explaining AfD’s rise solely in terms of migration and xenophobia is insufficient. If these were the only factors, it would be difficult to understand why the party has established such a strong social base specifically in eastern Germany. To understand this, it is necessary to look back at the history of German reunification.
The reunification of the two German states in 1990 established the country’s legal and political unity, but the lived experiences, social status, and sense of belonging of people in the East and West did not converge at the same pace. A significant part of the economic, administrative, and academic structures of the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik — DDR) ceased to exist, while the institutional models of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland — BRD) were extended across the entire country. For many people in the East, this process was perceived not so much as the unification of two equal societies, but rather as the absorption of one society by the system of the other.
This experience remains alive in the collective memory of parts of eastern German society. Many feel that the achievements of their lives during the DDR era were largely disregarded and that, after reunification, eastern Germans found themselves in a less favorable position in terms of social status and opportunities in life. The term “Ossi,” originally an informal designation for people from eastern Germany, in some contexts acquired a derogatory connotation, while eastern German accents, habits, and ways of life sometimes became the subject of jokes and ridicule.
Thus, the divide between East and West is not merely economic. It is also a divide in social status, historical memory, and the sense of belonging. When some politicians and researchers speak of the “internal colonization” of eastern Germany, the term is better understood not as an indisputable legal or historical fact, but as an expression of a particular social experience and political self-perception. For some people in the East, German reunification was not perceived as the coming together of two equal societies; rather, there was a sense that Western institutions, standards, and definitions of success had been imposed upon eastern German society.
This sense of being overlooked and disregarded, combined with economic difficulties and the decline of certain social opportunities, created fertile ground that AfD was later able to exploit. For this reason, voting for the party in eastern Germany cannot in every case be interpreted as a direct vote for racism or radical nationalism. Some of these votes may represent a protest against the governing parties, stem from a sense of humiliation, or reflect a desire to restore a political voice to regions whose inhabitants feel underrepresented in the existing political system. This explanation, of course, in no way means ignoring those AfD supporters who genuinely share the party’s far-right and anti-immigration views. Both realities can exist simultaneously.
AfD’s recent victory in Saxony-Anhalt is a striking example of this process. In the state election held on September 6, 2026, AfD won nearly 44 percent of the vote, achieving the strongest state-level electoral result in its history and securing 39 of the 83 seats in the state parliament. The result did not give the party an absolute majority, but it made AfD the strongest political force in the state.
At the center of this victory was Ulrich Siegmund, AfD’s leading candidate in Saxony-Anhalt. Siegmund is a 35-year-old politician who was born and raised in eastern Germany after reunification. He has succeeded in developing a distinctive way of communicating with certain groups of voters, particularly the younger generation. His strong presence on social media, especially TikTok, combined with his simple and direct language, has enabled him to connect with a generation whose relationship with traditional political parties and political media differs significantly from that of previous generations. In his own constituency, he also received 49 percent of the first votes.
Siegmund’s electoral appeal likewise cannot be explained solely by his hard-line stance on migration. During the election campaign, he made promises such as reducing the cost of obtaining a driver’s license for young people in education, expanding childcare facilities, renovating schools, and improving regional infrastructure. These promises directly address the everyday concerns of families and young people. It is precisely here that one of the differences between the new right-wing populists and the traditional conservative right becomes apparent. This new movement does not want to present itself merely as a defender of order, tradition, and lower taxes; it seeks to position itself as the voice of those who feel they are bearing the costs of economic and social change without receiving a sufficient share of its benefits.
This issue is particularly significant when it comes to the younger generation. If some young people vote for AfD, this cannot be explained solely as a “return of Nazism.” Today’s younger generation has no direct experience of National Socialism and has grown up under entirely different social conditions. Its concerns are more closely related to the cost of living, housing, employment prospects, rapid cultural change, and distrust of traditional parties. Since the established political forces have failed to find an appropriate language for communicating with younger voters or to offer them convincing political answers, it is hardly surprising that new forces have begun to fill the resulting vacuum. This is particularly the case given that AfD strongly advocates a return to the traditional policy of closer relations with Russia, an end to Germany’s militarization and its aid to Ukraine, as well as the restoration of access to cheap Russian energy.
At the same time, there is an important contradiction within AfD. The party may present itself as the voice of ordinary people and of regions that feel neglected, yet it contains currents that take a very hard line toward migrants and refugees and promote a particular cultural and ethnic conception of the German nation. Nor can one ignore the use by some party figures of words and concepts with historical roots in the far-right political tradition. When a term such as “Umvolkung” is used, it must be examined within its specific historical and political context; the fact that similar concepts may previously have been used by other politicians does not erase their historical sensitivity.
At the same time, the presence of citizens with a migration background among AfD’s members, leadership, or voters shows that this movement cannot be analyzed through simplistic ethnic frameworks either. This fact alone does not prove that AfD is not anti-immigration or hostile toward foreigners, but it does demonstrate that the new political nationalism is not defined solely by biological ancestry. A person may have a migration background while still considering themselves part of the same nationalist movement on the basis of cultural belonging, citizenship, and acceptance of a particular conception of the nation. Understanding this phenomenon therefore requires a distinction between ancestry, citizenship, cultural identity, and political position.
Another example of the blurring of traditional boundaries between left and right can be seen in the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht — BSW). Sahra Wagenknecht, whose father was Iranian and who grew up in eastern Germany, comes from the radical-left tradition. Yet on certain issues — including migration, the war in Ukraine, and relations with Russia — she holds positions that, in some respects, overlap with those of right-wing populists. This overlap demonstrates that contemporary political divisions do not always follow a simple left-right axis. A political movement may hold left-wing positions on economic and social issues while moving closer, on questions of nationhood, migration, or foreign policy, to positions more commonly associated with the political right.
Thus, the rise of AfD should be understood as the result of a combination of factors: the erosion of traditional boundaries between left and right, a crisis of political representation, dissatisfaction with globalization, the migration issue, the weakening of traditional parties, a sense of being overlooked and ignored in eastern Germany, and the ability of populist forces to transform these grievances into a simple and accessible political narrative.
The central challenge for liberal democracy arises when a significant proportion of citizens begins to feel that elections make no meaningful difference in their lives. Under such circumstances, any movement capable of translating their anger, fear, sense of humiliation, or hope into political language gains an opportunity to grow. AfD has demonstrated a considerable ability to do precisely this. Yet a party’s electoral success does not mean that the answers it offers are necessarily correct. A party may accurately identify a genuine problem while at the same time proposing solutions that are misguided, discriminatory, or dangerous.
Therefore, one of the weaknesses of Germany’s official political approach is that, at times, instead of addressing the social causes behind AfD’s rise, it focuses more heavily on condemning the party. Condemning far-right tendencies is necessary, but condemnation alone is not enough to solve the problem. If people in eastern Germany feel that their historical experience has been demeaned and devalued, if young people see no clear economic prospects, if families are struggling with the high cost of living, if wages have still not reached parity after more than 35 years, and if voters feel that traditional parties do not understand their language or concerns, simply declaring AfD an “extremist” party will not be enough to change the way they vote.
If German democracy wants to prevent the return of the dark experiences of the twentieth century, it must be able to distinguish between combating the far right and understanding the society that votes for it. Defending democracy cannot be reduced merely to defending existing structures. Democracy remains resilient when citizens feel that they are seen, that their voices are heard, and that they are able to influence their own future through democratic means.
It is from this perspective that AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt should be viewed neither as a passing episode nor, in itself, as evidence of a return to National Socialism. Rather, the victory points to a deeper crisis within Germany’s system of political representation — one that has become more visible in the eastern part of the country, but whose roots are by no means confined to the East. If the traditional parties attempt to contain this crisis solely by erecting a political barrier — the so-called “firewall” — against AfD, they may succeed in keeping the party out of government for a time, but they will not be able to eliminate the underlying causes of social discontent.
Thus, the central question concerning Germany’s future is not simply how far AfD may advance. The more important question is why millions of German citizens have come to believe that, in order for their voices to be heard, they must vote for a party that a significant part of the political establishment regards as far-right. Answering this question requires looking beyond political labels — an approach capable of recognizing the genuine danger posed by the far right while at the same time refusing to deny the genuine grievances that exist within society.
In this sense, understanding AfD does not mean defending it. On the contrary, only through a precise understanding of the social, historical, and political roots of this movement is it possible to respond to it effectively, democratically, and rationally. German democracy will remain resilient in the face of extremism only if it is afraid neither to listen to the voice of society nor to critically examine the political structures that have driven some citizens toward radical political movements.
