The Historical Roots of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Current Crisis — Who Bears Responsibility?
Author: Farrukh Hasankhan Baloch, analyst (Pakistan)
Translated from Urdu by Sangar
When we try to determine who bears responsibility for the instability, terrorism, and renewed surge in TTP activity now confronting Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan), Tank, Lakki Marwat, and Waziristan, we often select only one part of the story, depending on our own political leanings. Some blame Imran Khan; others point to General Bajwa and General Faiz Hameed; still others hold Musharraf responsible, while some believe that the problem emerged only after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan.
In my view, each of these perspectives contains an element of truth, but none tells the whole story. If we genuinely want to trace the historical origins of the TTP, excluding the 1980s and beginning the story in 2001 would mean telling only half of it.
The First Major Turning Point: The Afghan Jihad
In December 1979, the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan. Thereafter, under the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia began providing extensive financial, military, and political support to the Afghan mujahideen.
For the United States, the objective was to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; Saudi Arabia provided substantial financial resources, while Pakistan became the “frontline state” of this strategy. Pakistani territory, particularly the areas bordering Afghanistan, assumed exceptional importance in this war.
Volunteers from various Muslim countries around the world also came to the region to participate in the Afghan jihad. Their arrival, financial support, and logistical organization were facilitated through various state, religious, charitable, and jihadist networks. It was in this environment that the networks of Osama bin Laden and Arab militants subsequently took root and expanded.
One important point needs to be clarified here: at the time, they were not called the Taliban. They were the “Afghan mujahideen,” whom the West often referred to as “freedom fighters.” The Taliban emerged as an organized movement only in the 1990s.
It would also be incorrect to claim that Pakistan’s ties with Afghan Islamist groups originated from scratch in 1979. Even under Bhutto, Pakistan maintained contacts with certain Afghan Islamists who opposed Daoud’s government. After 1979, however, the scale of what was taking place — the volume of funding, weapons, training, and international involvement in the jihad — far exceeded anything that had come before.
It was precisely in this environment that a vast armed and ideological infrastructure took shape in our region.
The Soviet Union Left, but the Structure of War Remained
In 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, but the entire jihadist infrastructure that had been created could not simply be dismantled at the push of a button.
The weapons remained, the trained militants remained, and the religious and military networks continued to exist. Afghanistan descended into civil war, and in the 1990s it was from this broader environment that the Afghan Taliban emerged as a new force.
It was here that one fundamental mistake was made: the armed environment that had been created or strengthened to achieve a particular objective did not simply disappear once that objective had been achieved. And here it is important to understand one key principle: even the most carefully conceived and calculated policies of major powers can produce the opposite of the intended result. Policymakers act according to the interests of their own time, but twenty or thirty years later, the consequences of their decisions do not always remain under their control.
The Second Major Turning Point: September 11 and General Musharraf
Then came September 11, 2001. The United States launched a war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and General Pervez Musharraf decided to turn Pakistan into a “frontline ally” of the United States in the “War on Terror.”
This was an extremely significant strategic shift.
Many of the forces with which Pakistan and the West had maintained relations during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s now became enemies of the United States and its allies. Members of al-Qaeda, Taliban fighters, and other militants began moving from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s tribal areas, while the Pakistani military began conducting operations there.
It was from this point onward that the confrontation between the Pakistani state and local armed religious groups took on a new form. Military operations were conducted, U.S. drone strikes were carried out, the local population also suffered from the war, and various Pakistani armed groups began to regard the Pakistani state itself as their enemy.
Therefore, the argument that Musharraf’s alliance with the United States in the “War on Terror” was one of the major factors contributing to the formation of the TTP cannot be dismissed as entirely groundless. But it would be equally incorrect to argue that, had Musharraf not made this decision, armed religious extremism would not have existed in the region at all.
The ground for it had been prepared long before.
2007 — The Formal Establishment of the TTP
In 2007, a series of events, including the operation at the Red Mosque, further aggravated the situation. In December of that year, various Pakistani Taliban groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud beneath a single umbrella, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) formally emerged.
This distinction is extremely important. The mujahideen of the 1980s, the Afghan Taliban of the 1990s, and the TTP, established in 2007, were not the same organization. At the same time, the historical, ideological, organizational, and military links that existed between them cannot be ignored.
In other words, it would be incorrect to claim that the United States, Saudi Arabia, or General Zia “created the TTP” in the 1980s, since the TTP itself was not founded until 2007. It is, however, entirely reasonable to say that the jihadist environment that took shape in the 1980s, together with subsequent policies toward Afghanistan, played a role in preparing the ground from which various armed organizations emerged several decades later.
Then Pakistan Went to War Against the TTP
After the creation of the TTP, Pakistan paid a very high price. Civilians, the army, the police, the Levies forces (local police), and tribal elders — all became targets. Terrorism spread throughout the country.
Eventually, major military campaigns, above all Operation Zarb-e-Azb, as well as subsequent operations, inflicted serious damage on the TTP’s structures inside Pakistan. Many of its militants and leaders relocated to Afghanistan.
This victory came at a very high cost. Thousands of Pakistanis were killed, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes, and the state expended enormous financial and human resources.
The Third Major Turning Point: August 2021
Then another historic change took place in Afghanistan. In August 2021, the Afghan Taliban once again took control of Kabul. At the time, Imran Khan was serving as prime minister of Pakistan, General Qamar Javed Bajwa was Chief of Army Staff, and General Faiz Hameed headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Pakistan began negotiations with the TTP, which was based in Afghanistan. General Faiz Hameed subsequently also became corps commander in Peshawar and played a prominent and direct role in these negotiations.
Here, too, history should not be distorted to suit one’s own political preferences. It would be incorrect to claim that Imran Khan knew nothing and that everything was done exclusively by the military. Imran Khan’s government confirmed that negotiations were taking place, while Imran Khan himself supported the idea that the return and reintegration into society of those who laid down their arms, accepted the Constitution of Pakistan, and returned to peaceful life could be discussed.
Thus, Imran Khan bears his share of political responsibility. But it would be equally incorrect to claim that Imran Khan devised this policy single-handedly and that the military had nothing to do with it.
Historically, the military and intelligence structures have played a very significant role in shaping Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan, the TTP, border security, and the tribal areas. General Bajwa was Chief of Army Staff, while General Faiz Hameed was one of the key figures directly involved in negotiations with the TTP.
Therefore, General Bajwa’s senior military and institutional responsibility is also evident, as is General Faiz Hameed’s responsibility for the negotiations and their practical implementation.
The Main Mistake Was Not the Negotiations Themselves, but How They Were Conducted
States negotiate even with their enemies. The mere fact of holding negotiations is neither an act of betrayal nor a crime.
The main questions lay elsewhere: Were the returning militants fully disarmed beforehand? Were their weapons confiscated? Was a reliable system established for their full identification, registration, and subsequent monitoring? Did the state have an effective mechanism to ensure that, after returning, these individuals would not re-establish their former armed networks? And if no such guarantees existed, on what basis were the ceasefire process, the release of a number of TTP prisoners, and their return and reintegration initiated?
In my view, this was the biggest mistake of 2021–2022. The negotiations and ceasefire allowed the TTP to catch its breath and reorganize its forces. In 2022, armed Taliban fighters once again began appearing in various areas, including Swat.
Subsequently, this ceased to be merely an accusation made by political opponents. In 2023, Pakistan’s National Security Committee strongly criticized the previous policy toward the TTP, identifying the return of terrorists and the release of dangerous TTP prisoners as among the factors that contributed to the renewed rise in terrorism. General Asim Munir also stated during a closed-door briefing in parliament that the negotiations had given terrorists an opportunity to regroup and that the policy ultimately produced adverse and damaging consequences.
Would Things Have Turned Out Differently if Someone Other Than Imran Khan Had Been Prime Minister?
This question must also be asked.
Had Nawaz Sharif, Asif Ali Zardari, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, or someone else been prime minister in 2021, it cannot be stated with certainty that there would have been no negotiations with the TTP at all. Nawaz Sharif’s government itself held negotiations with the TTP in 2014. When those negotiations failed, it supported Operation Zarb-e-Azb.
During the PPP government, an attempt was initially made to reach a peace agreement in Swat. However, when the Taliban advance continued, a large-scale military operation was supported in 2009.
Maulana Fazlur Rehman also took a relatively conciliatory position toward the Afghan Taliban; therefore, it is difficult to assume that under his leadership the question of negotiations would not have arisen at all. More importantly, Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan and the TTP has never been determined exclusively by the Prime Minister’s Office.
The military and intelligence agencies have played an extremely significant role in shaping that policy. It is therefore entirely possible that negotiations would have taken place under another prime minister as well. The difference would likely have been in the terms under which those negotiations were conducted, at what stage prisoners would have been released, who would have been allowed to return, what requirements would have been imposed regarding complete disarmament, and how the government would have responded to the first signs of a threat.
However, Imran Khan cannot be absolved of responsibility because he supposedly lacked the authority. Under the Constitution, the prime minister of Pakistan is the head of the country’s executive branch, and Imran Khan not only did not oppose this policy but also supported it.
Likewise, the military leadership cannot be absolved of responsibility simply because Imran Khan was prime minister. Both sides participated in the process, although their roles and powers were different.
The Story Did Not End After April 2022 Either
After Imran Khan’s government came to an end, Shehbaz Sharif became prime minister, but negotiations with the TTP did not cease that same day. The process continued for some time, and the Parliamentary Committee on National Security also approved the continuation of negotiations within the framework of the Constitution and under parliamentary oversight.
Therefore, the government that subsequently came to power cannot claim that it had nothing to do with this entire process.
So Who Ultimately Bears Responsibility?
If we try to place responsibility for this entire history on a single person in one sentence, the answer will be incorrect. At different stages of this crisis, responsibility lies with different actors.
The 1980s: The Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union received extensive financial, political, and military support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq. As a result, a powerful jihadist infrastructure and a corresponding environment took shape in the region.
The 1990s: After the outbreak of the civil war in Afghanistan and the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan gave this environment a new form.
After 2001: Pakistan’s transformation under General Musharraf into a U.S. “frontline ally” in the “War on Terror,” the war in Afghanistan, military operations in the tribal areas, and the backlash that followed played a very important role in the spread of Talibanization in Pakistan and, subsequently, in the emergence of the TTP.
2007: Various Pakistani Taliban groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, and the TTP emerged.
In the years that followed: At the cost of enormous human and financial losses, the Pakistani state succeeded in largely pushing the TTP out of Pakistan itself.
2021–2022: After the Afghan Taliban returned to Kabul, during Imran Khan’s government, with General Bajwa at the helm of the military and General Faiz Hameed playing a prominent role in the negotiations, an experiment was undertaken involving negotiations with the TTP, a ceasefire, the release of a number of prisoners, and their return and reintegration. Ultimately, this process failed seriously and allowed the TTP to reorganize its forces.
After April 2022: The new government also did not immediately end the negotiation process; therefore, it too cannot completely distance itself from responsibility for this phase.
However, throughout this entire debate, one fundamental principle must not be forgotten: misguided state policies cannot serve as a justification for TTP terrorism.
We can acknowledge that the Afghanistan policy of the Zia-ul-Haq era had long-term negative consequences, that Musharraf’s policy within the framework of the “War on Terror” played a role in fueling the Pakistani Taliban insurgency, and that the policy toward the TTP in 2021–2022 allowed an already existing adversary to reorganize its forces. But responsibility for the killing of Pakistani civilians, police officers, military personnel, and others lies with the TTP itself.
In other words, two realities must be acknowledged simultaneously:
The TTP is a terrorist organization, while at the same time various Pakistani governments and military leaders have made serious policy mistakes over the past several decades, the consequences of which have repeatedly exacerbated this problem. Today, Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan), Tank, Lakki Marwat, Waziristan, and southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are paying the price for this long history.
Therefore, the debate should not be reduced to attempts to absolve Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf, Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif or Zardari, General Bajwa, or General Faiz Hameed.
In history, each person’s responsibility should be determined according to the role they played. And perhaps the main lesson is precisely this: policies that states pursue for short-term strategic gains can, decades later, turn against them — in such a way that it is the generations that follow who are left to pay the price for their consequences.
