The former head of Afghan intelligence is confident that the events in Crimea in 2014 pushed the United States to a deal with the Taliban, banned in the Russian Federation.
Author: Andrey Serenko, Nezavisimaya Gazeta's correspondent
The former chief of Afghan intelligence and the last vice-president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), Amrullah SALEH, gave an exclusive interview with NG columnist Andrei SERENKO. In this interview, Amrullah Saleh spoke for the first time about unknown episodes of Afghan-American relations that immediately preceded the fall of the republican government in Kabul and the rise to power in the country of the Taliban movement (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation). Amrullah Saleh calls Washington’s policy towards its Afghan ally treacherous and regrets that President Ashraf Ghani’s team, having become a hostage of American intrigues, missed the chance to save the country by refusing to support Russian initiatives in the field of the Afghan peace settlement.
– Mr. Amrullah, one of the main mysteries of modern Afghan history is the rapid fall of the republic’s regime in August 2021 and the transfer of power in the country to the Taliban. Why was this possible? Why did the republican regime, which existed in Afghanistan for about 20 years, collapse like a house of cards?
– I disagree that the republican system collapsed suddenly, overnight, like a house of cards. No, it was a very lengthy process, although not always accessible to external viewers. It began in the spring of 2011, almost immediately after the Americans eliminated the leader of Al-Qaeda (an organization banned in the Russian Federation) Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. It was then that the United States entered into the first negotiations with the Taliban, which ultimately ended in February 2020 with the signing of the US-Taliban agreement in Doha. And all these almost ten years it was a very soft, gradual process.
It received additional acceleration after the events in Crimea in 2014. I can imagine that the Taliban and the Americans started meeting every week after that. And then the United States finally decided to leave Afghanistan. Events in Crimea played a very large role in this intention of Washington. By the way, the Americans are now quite openly talking about this themselves, linking the Afghan and Ukrainian stories.
Then, at the very beginning of the negotiation process with the Taliban, the United States had two options for ending its protracted Afghan mission. The first is to preserve the republican system and pluralistic power in Afghanistan, to protect it. But then this would require serious resources from Washington, and a rather high price would have to be paid for this decision. The Americans did not want to do this.
The second option is to forget about the republican experiment, about political pluralism, and give power in Afghanistan to the hands of an armed, violent authoritarian group - the Taliban. This scenario is fully consistent with the “Kissinger Doctrine” previously tested by the United States in Afghanistan.
– Are we talking about the strategy that Henry Kissinger formulated back in the 80s?
– Yes, then, at the very beginning of the 80s, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other American strategists were thinking about what strategy the United States should follow in Afghanistan, where Soviet troops had just entered. He believed that not the pluralistic, but, on the contrary, the radical nature of power in Afghanistan would serve US security interests. Then he wrote why it was necessary to help the mujahideen from the Afghan armed opposition: it was impossible for America to openly fight with the USSR since this would be the third world war. But if the United States wanted to defeat the USSR, then to solve this problem they “better go through the backyard.”
Americans traditionally see Eurasia and Central Asia as a geopolitical “backyard” of Russia. So they chose the second option in the 80s and then repeated this choice in 2020.
After the events in Crimea, the United States decided that it must prepare for a possible major conflict with Moscow and that this would require curtailing its Afghan mission. Moreover, by that time Afghanistan had already ceased to interest Washington as keenly as before.
– Why do you think the bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan was violated?
– Indeed, the Afghan Republic and Washington had one common document - a bilateral security agreement. According to it, the United States had to inform Kabul a year before the decision was made on the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. However, in the end, they violated this provision of the agreement, which they signed.
During the presidency of Barack Obama, the conversation between Kabul and Washington lasted about four years before the final document was signed, this was done slowly. I don't know why the Americans violated this agreement. Perhaps because they have always seen Afghanistan as a weak partner that cannot do without US help and with whom there is no need to stand on ceremony.
In June 2021, less than two months before the collapse of the republic, a small Afghan delegation visited Washington: President Ashraf Ghani, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib, and myself. Officially, I was not a member of the delegation, but Ghani persistently asked me to go with him, noting in a conversation with me that he did not trust this trip.
Then in Washington, we took part in several events. First, on June 23, 2021, a joint dinner was organized with a large group of influential people - among them were former CIA Director General David Petraeus, three former American ambassadors, and several generals. There was only one person from the US presidential administration - Tom West, who today is the American special representative for Afghanistan.
In total, 50–60 influential people in Washington took part in the event. Ashraf Ghani then told me that he did not want to criticize President Biden at such a meeting, that tomorrow we would have a special meeting at the White House, and therefore it was worth using the dinner format to convey a positive message to the presidential team.
– What did Ashraf Ghani talk about then and what kind of response did he receive from the Americans?
– Ghani explained to those present his position in connection with the Americans’ intentions to leave Afghanistan, and they listened to him politely. Then an exchange of views took place. The last speaker at this joint dinner was Petraeus. The former CIA director said the US administration had decided to act as if it were involved in a major crime. US political and military intelligence will finance crimes in your country, General Petraeus told Ashraf Ghani: if you dare to act in such a situation, I congratulate you, but our actions will resemble crimes.
The next day there were meetings at the White House in which Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah were to be directly involved. The plan was for me to wait in another room. However, at the last minute, they invited me to take part in a conversation with the US President.
– What did you personally discuss with Joseph Biden?
- Biden greeted me and said that he knew about the difficult work of the deputy president since he had previously held a similar post. I thanked him and asked permission to ask three questions.
First: is the negotiation process in Doha between the US and the Taliban a peace process or preparation for regime change in Afghanistan? Second: will your logistical, financial, and military support continue after the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan or not? And third: if the Taliban surrounds Kabul, do you have a “plan B” in an emergency, and how can we stop the collapse of the republic? After the withdrawal of your troops, will a mechanism be created for our joint work (through the embassy, the structure of military attaches, etc.), what form of US presence in Afghanistan is expected?
Biden responded by saying that these are good fundamental questions, but Pentagon chief General Lloyd Austin should explain them. The US President himself avoided answering.
– Did you manage to communicate with Austin? What conclusions did you draw for yourself after the conversation?
– It was successful, after the conversation with Biden there was a big meeting with General Austin. He said the Americans would continue to provide military assistance to Kabul. I asked if you are continuing military assistance for the Republic, then why does the logistics contract end on September 1, 2021, and no other contract continues after that date? Austin responded that a certain general named Bazer would come to Afghanistan and explain all the details and details of how the United States would continue to provide military assistance to the Republican government in Kabul. I asked if there was a “plan B” in case Kabul was surrounded by the Taliban. The head of the Pentagon replied: yes, US air assistance will continue. And again he said that General Bazer would explain everything to us during his visit to Afghanistan.
In other words, we did not receive a single concrete answer from our American partners at that time. But they promised us that the United States would never betray the Afghan republic, that the negotiations in Doha are not a process of regime change, they emphasized that they were protecting their reputation and did not break their promises. In a word, they simply lulled us to sleep for a long time with a big and sweet political speech.
I will add that then there was a third meeting in Washington - with CIA Director William Burns. Ghani, Abdullah, and I also participated, and it was the longest conversation, it lasted three hours. Throughout these 180 minutes, Burns explained that the United States maintained its reputation as a reliable ally: we are careful, he said, we will stop the Taliban if they surround Kabul, and we will continue to put military pressure on them. At the same time, Burns said that the next administration in Afghanistan should be formed through a peace agreement with the Taliban and that the United States would be against other options.
After a conversation with the CIA chief, we returned to Kabul. And the discrepancy between the promises and deeds of the Americans immediately became obvious. When the Taliban surrounded Kabul a few weeks later, we also did not receive any promised help from the United States.
– Did General Bazer, who finally arrived in Kabul then, give you any explanations?
- He said that preparations were being made for the evacuation of the US Embassy, but he assured that “this is a normal procedure” and “everything will be fine.” I then lost patience, even shouted and said that the Americans were simply leaving our country, that they were deceiving us, telling lies.
For twenty years, the US slogans in Afghanistan have been first the fight against terrorism, then the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan, then the protection of populated areas, then the peace process, then the promise that the US embassy will work, and finally, in the end, they say that evacuation is normal procedure. This was already the apotheosis of lies.
But there was another interesting story - it took place a little earlier than the first, in February 2020. At that time, President Ghani and I were in Germany to participate in an international security conference. There we met with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.
Pompeo, the most arrogant man in Donald Trump's administration, looked Ashraf Ghani in the eye and demanded: "I want you here in Germany to make a statement that you and your administration support the American agreement with the Taliban in Doha". It was an open dictatorship. Ghani, who was educated in the US and speaks good English, said that this was impossible and asked me to explain why we could not take such a step.
– And what did you say to the US Secretary of State?
- I told the truth: Mr. Minister, we are not your hostages or prisoners here. If we declare support for the Doha agreement, a document we have never seen, the people in Afghanistan will think we are traitors. I am not ready to pay such a price and I am not ready to participate in this performance. If we return to Kabul after such a recognition, there will be a coup there, the airport will no longer be under our control, and we do not know how many American citizens will die in this case.
After these words, Pompeo changed his mind and asked what could be an alternative to his proposal. Ghani replied that we need time, we will return to Afghanistan, where we will have to hold consultations with people’s representatives and decide together how we will complement the decision in Doha. Ghani said he was not ready to support a document that he had not read or seen.
This was a revealing episode - the United States wanted to use us as puppets, but we were not ready to be American dolls.
When we returned to Kabul, we began preparations for the Loya Jirga (All-Afghan People's Congress - NG), which was held in August 2020. There we received a new political mandate from our citizens, but at the same time, our political positions not only did not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weakened.
– What do you see as the reason for the political weakening of the Ghani government?
– The Americans demanded from Ghani the release of 5 thousand Taliban who were in Afghan prisons for committing dangerous and cruel crimes, for terrorist activities. Washington thus insisted that we pay for a hypothetical peace by releasing several thousand real criminals. We told the Americans that we could not agree to this. After that, the US directly told us that the next administration in Afghanistan would be a “peaceful administration” formed “taking into account the diversity of Afghan society,” that is, with the participation of the Taliban.
At the same time, American representatives assured Kabul that the goal of the peace process in Doha was not a change in the regime of the republic, that the United States allegedly supported political pluralism, and that they were grateful to Ghani for his consultations with the Afghan people and welcomed the results of the Loya Jirga.
As a result, we were forced to release 5 thousand Taliban, who immediately took up arms and joined the fight against the Afghan government. At the same time, the Afghan government did not receive any military or technical assistance from the United States. On the contrary, the Americans began to stab us in the back, deploying all their “soft power” instruments against Ashraf Ghani’s team.
– Has the United States opened a “second front” against the Afghan government?
–Yes, they used their “soft power” against the republic. The Washington-controlled media in Afghanistan began to unanimously accuse President Ghani of a thirst for power and corruption, and a full-scale campaign began to discredit the republican government and weaken its position in the country.
By the way, this has happened before. After 2015, the United States repeatedly used “soft power” against the republic. In Afghanistan at that time 250 radio stations received financial assistance from the US Embassy, dozens of television channels, many newspapers... We had under control only one state television channel, which, moreover, was not the most popular.
Since 2018, these instruments of “soft power” have almost openly worked against the republic. American-controlled Afghan media said that a new “Taliban” had allegedly emerged, that the Taliban were no longer against human rights, not against women’s rights, that the Taliban had allegedly changed and now respected the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of Afghanistan, etc. At the same time, the Taliban representatives themselves did not say anything like that...
When the Afghan government was ready to create a temporary joint administration with the Taliban, pushed by the Americans, the Americans no longer heard us, because they accepted the second option for a post-Afghan presence - the transfer of all power in Afghanistan to the hands of a radical movement that would defend US interests without high costs from Washington.
– What would you call the biggest mistake of the Afghan republican government in the last years of its existence?
– Our biggest mistake is blind trust in the United States and the promises of the collective West. Also, our big mistake was that other countries in the region, in particular Russia, built a parallel peace process, which the United States did not support and sabotaged Moscow’s initiatives, while Kabul was on the side of the Americans, ignoring these alternative regional projects.
Kabul's position was very weak, it listened too much to Washington, perhaps President Ghani himself did not deeply understand the Western conspiracy against our country, and as a result, he acted against the same Russian process. As a result, only one trial in Doha, controlled by the United States, remained on the political agenda.
It was a conspiracy against Kabul: as a result of Washington's efforts, we had no allies left in the region, and when we became especially weak, the United States began to mercilessly exploit our weaknesses.
If we had once supported the Russian peace process and Moscow’s initiatives on Afghanistan, we would not have been so dependent on Washington. And then the collapse of the republic would not have occurred according to the scenario of the collapse of a house of cards. I think this was our biggest mistake.
– Why did the Americans ultimately betray the Afghan republic and who exactly is behind this betrayal? After all, both the Republican Trump administration and the Democratic Biden administration made a collective contribution to the return of the Taliban to power and the destruction of Afghanistan...
- I don’t think it was a decision of the US Republican or Democratic parties, it was a decision of the American “deep state.” Let me remind you that this process was first launched by Obama, who began negotiations with the Taliban immediately after the death of bin Laden. Then it was Trump who demanded that Kabul support the agreement with the Taliban in Doha. Then Biden blamed the preparation of the Doha Agreement on Trump but did not cancel it.
In my opinion, the betrayal of Afghanistan is the sin of the “deep state” in the United States, and not specifically the Republican or Democratic parties. The American “deep state”, a narrow circle of influential people who draw up such strategies, and select roads to the future - they are the ones who decided that Afghanistan is no longer worth the previous support with all the ensuing consequences.
– What is the “Deep State” in the USA?
– Technocrats, whom neither I nor you know, survive by working for all administrations, for the CIA, the Pentagon. There are many strong lobbying groups there, and they know that the external facade of US power should be liberal, but the real power of the US is never liberal, it is always a very rigid vertical. When American institutions and their officials have to defend the hegemonic position of the United States in the world, they act like harsh dictatorships, although outwardly they have an almost exemplary liberal façade.
– So you believe that liberalism does not play a real role in the organization of power in the United States?
– American liberalism is very selective. If one person with a sign goes to a protest in Moscow, or several people start protesting in Tehran, it will almost certainly become the main news in the United States. But when hundreds of Americans surrounded the White House in Washington with protest slogans or thousands of Britons blocked roads in London, everything was done to prevent this from becoming real news in the US information space. A few killed Ukrainians is a tragedy for American liberalism, and tens of thousands of killed Palestinians are just inevitable victims.
I think the American establishment uses liberalism when it suits it and ignores it when it doesn't. American officials are good actors. I have long noticed that an ordinary American citizen and an American official are completely different people. Americans are good people, just like representatives of all other nations. However, an American official is a person who will look straight into your eyes and lie shamelessly.
– In politics, the end often justifies the means...
– The United States uses any tools to protect America’s hegemony and position in the world. For this mission, for this goal, they will violate any ethics and principles. When the United States undertakes a special mission abroad, it fully utilizes all the capabilities that are under its control.
My last discussion with US officials was by telephone - with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August 2021. At the time, President Ghani and I told him that the Taliban were surrounding Kabul, but that we had a security agreement with the United States, according to which the Americans should support us.
Blinken responded by saying that you have a constitution in Afghanistan, but it is a weak document. Before this, US representatives constantly said that the main achievement of 20 years of their presence in Afghanistan was the Afghan constitution and the state-political system created on its basis. In August 2021, one of the highest US officials openly said that this constitution is an unnecessary document...
American officials and Blinken is one of them, do not have horizontal decision-making mechanisms, only vertical forms. Blinken then dictated to us one goal of the United States - to simply leave Afghanistan and not hear what the Americans themselves have been saying for 20 years.
– What lesson did you learn from the events that happened in Afghanistan?
- I advise all new generations of Afghans to remember this lesson. The lesson is this: you hear now and will hear in the future a lot of sweet words from foreigners, especially from Americans, but be extremely careful.
Don't trust these words. Never break relations with neighboring states for the sake of these words. Don't think that what you hear from Americans is true. It may be a picture that reflects reality 20, 50, or 70%, but it will never be one hundred percent reality.
– Many American politicians, experts, and journalists today still argue that the cause of the death of the republic in Afghanistan was corruption and not betrayal by the “deep state” in the United States...
– There was corruption. But not at all the kind that the American media likes to talk about. I'll give just one example. During the American presence in Afghanistan, small trucks were delivered to our country, each of which cost 22-23 thousand dollars. At the same time, the repair budget for each truck was also set at 22 thousand dollars. The specialists who carried out the repair services were Afghans, but their management and contract were in the hands of the Americans, it was an American company. Details of these contracts were not available to the Afghan government. I then asked why the cost of the truck itself was paid for repairing the truck, and I said that I would not sign such a contract for repair service. In response, I was told that this contract was signed by some very high people.
When the Americans decided to leave Afghanistan, the director of the company came to Kabul and reported that his contract with the US government was worth $2 billion annually. After which he said that he was ready to continue the same contract with the Afghan government for $200 million. Having learned about this, American representatives were indignant, saying that if the Afghan government supported the contract on new terms, it would turn out that they, the Americans, were thieves who annually received $1 billion 800 million for themselves. And this is just for the repair of small trucks...
Julian Assange once wrote that the United States would leave Afghanistan and hand over power for a second time to the Taliban because US officials did not want people in their country to know how much money they stole from Afghanistan. Assange said that these people want to bury their sins and crimes with the help of the Taliban. And he was right. The death of the republic in Afghanistan was not due to corruption. Yes, there was corruption, but it was not the fundamental reason for the collapse and collapse of the republican regime.
The main reason is the decision of the American “deep state” to follow a very old geopolitical doctrine of the 60-70s of the twentieth century. Washington sees countries such as Russia and China only as its opponents. The Americans are preparing their troops, their intelligence, influence, and pressure structures for a large hybrid war, which is sure to happen in the future.
