The rules of the game are still unclear, but its consequences for the people are all too real.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, a researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
The Pakistani military has once again stated that it has no dispute or problem with the people of Afghanistan and that its main problem is the Taliban regime. At the same time, it argues that the Taliban government is not inclusive and does not represent the Afghan people. Yet in the very next breath, it says that if the Taliban prevents attacks against Pakistan, Islamabad will have no problem with the Taliban government. In other words, you imposed on Afghanistan a regime lacking legitimacy and popular support in pursuit of your own objectives, but now that the game has changed, you are raising an outcry.
This creates a major contradiction. Whenever Pakistan’s interests are threatened, the Afghan people become a convenient pretext. Ostensibly, the problem is not with the people, yet it is these very people who bear the burden of Pakistan’s security, military, and intelligence policies.
The Pakistani military has warned that if the Taliban fails to prevent attacks originating from Afghan territory, Islamabad will activate its “old levers” and go to any lengths. A military spokesman has said that they do not negotiate with terrorists — they eliminate them. But this raises a question: since when has terrorism become a problem for Pakistan?
Over the past twenty years, Pakistan itself has been accused of supporting groups that later came to power. When these groups operated in line with the interests of Pakistan and its allies, the definition of terrorism apparently seemed to be different. Now that Pakistan is under pressure from attacks by regional rivals and armed groups, the same phenomenon has become its principal threat.
Of course, the issue should not be oversimplified. The security threats within Pakistan are real, and armed attacks have serious consequences for the country’s population. But the fight against terrorism cannot be defined according to short-term interests and political relationships.
The nature of the game in Afghanistan is still not entirely clear. The role of the Taliban, Pakistan’s policies, and their connection to Western agendas in the region require closer examination. Has Pakistan truly been left alone on the Afghan chessboard, or does it remain part of a broader security calculus in which the country is used to exert pressure on regional rivals?
Islamabad, on the one hand, wants greater room for maneuver as the situation in Afghanistan changes, while on the other, it fears that India and other regional rivals may use the Taliban or the existing situation against Pakistan. This is why it justifies its military, diplomatic, and security pressure as necessary for self-defense.
A representative of the Pakistani military has said that terrorists are present in Kandahar, Kabul, and other areas and that their activities must be stopped. He even noted that Pakistan has information about their locations. This raises a question: if intelligence and the capability to act are available, why do the mechanisms for confronting and targeting them remain so unclear? Is this really only about a security threat, or is the issue also connected to control over the Afghan arena?
Pakistan also emphasizes the commitments under the Doha Agreement, arguing that the Taliban must not allow Afghan territory to be used for terrorist activities against other countries. But this raises another question: has the Doha Agreement become a political instrument? Is it being used to justify increased pressure on the Taliban, or is the objective genuinely to prevent the activities of armed groups?
The Taliban’s own position in this situation is also contradictory. On the one hand, it claims that no terrorist groups are present on Afghan soil; on the other, in an effort to ease pressure, it keeps the door open for dialogue with Pakistan and other countries in the region. Given its experience of the regime’s collapse in 2001 and its entanglement in various intelligence networks, the group understands just how fragile its current position is.
The Taliban is in a difficult position. On the one hand, it faces a crisis of domestic and international legitimacy; on the other, it confronts the threat posed by ISIS-Khorasan, pressure from Pakistan, and rivalry among regional powers. This is why it seeks support through various projects and temporary backing from different countries.
In this context, the role of Saudi Arabia also deserves attention. On the one hand, Riyadh seeks to play a role in reducing tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan; on the other, it is pursuing its own interests in its rivalry with Iran and in expanding its regional influence. Afghanistan may serve as an important security and geopolitical arena for various players, including Saudi Arabia and its Western allies. At the same time, any claims about links between investments, armed groups, and intelligence programs must be examined based on independent evidence. Not every security development can be attributed to a single project without evidence.
Another important point concerns statements by the Pakistani military about the possibility of improving relations with the Taliban. It has been stated that the disagreements are not permanent and that relations could improve if the Taliban addresses Islamabad’s security concerns.
But what is the political meaning of these statements? Does Pakistan expect the Taliban to coordinate exclusively with Islamabad and limit its relations with India, Iran, Russia, China, Turkey, and Arab countries? Are security concerns, in fact, being used as a cover for preserving Pakistan’s influence and control over the Taliban’s decisions?
The Taliban faces a difficult choice. On the one hand, it cannot ignore its past dependencies and pressure from Pakistan; on the other, it is trying to establish broader relations with countries across the region. Any move it makes could trigger a reaction from Islamabad.
Pakistan itself is also in a difficult position. The country faces economic problems, domestic insecurity, regional rivalry, and political pressure. Its options are not limited to military measures. Support for opponents of the Taliban, diplomatic pressure, the use of international ties, and coordination with Western security programs are among the courses of action that may figure in Islamabad’s calculations. On the other side, the Taliban faces a lack of legitimacy, growing alienation from the Afghan people, and mounting security challenges.
Thus, this is not merely a dispute between Pakistan and the Taliban. It is a more complex game in which each side seeks to shift responsibility for the crisis onto the other while simultaneously gaining greater room for maneuver. The Afghan people have once again found themselves at the center of this game — a game whose rules are still not entirely clear, but whose consequences for the people are all too real.
