The movements observed among the opponents of the Taliban — where do they originate?
Sangar presents the views of two analysts from Afghanistan.
MUHYIDDIN MAHDI, POLITICIAN AND RESEARCHER
The new coalition pursues the following objectives:
First: Iran, having noticed the decline of Taliban power, seeks to bring representatives of various ethnic groups and political parties into their ruling circle so that, if it cannot prevent the fall of the regime, it will at least not be left without a share in Afghanistan’s future.
Second: This ambition of Iran, formulated in accordance with its national interests, fully aligns with the intentions of figures such as Hanif Atmar and Mohammad Omar Daudzai and others; for they, too, wish to prevent the “collapse” of Taliban rule, which would mean the transfer of power to non-Afghans (as happened in 2001).
Third: Those who had a name and a position during the Second Republic have gathered in this coalition in the hope that in the “Third Republic” (a term coined by Daudzai) they will also secure a position.
Fourth: At a time when there is a danger that Taliban power may collapse due to Pakistan — which is dissatisfied with the homogeneous Afghan rule — and when the slogan “I am not Afghan” is turning into a discourse of non-Afghans (which itself signals the fall of the regime), the emphasis on an “intra-Afghan dialogue” implies an effort to prevent the creation of a new political narrative in which “rationality and justice” replace “Afghan identity” at the core.
Fifth: Atmar, Daudzai, and many others, out of fear of “transparent elections,” handed power over to the Taliban; now, in coordination with them — and through Iran’s mediation — they intend to reclaim it so that “power based on Afghan identity” may continue. And if they can, they aim to prolong this process indefinitely, just like Putin and Medvedev!
Sixth: Some of those who were Atmar’s partners in the last elections of the Second Republic argued that “Ghani” could be removed from the Arg only through Atmar. It is likely that now, once again following him, they intend to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan using the same “model of keeping one’s promises” and the “temptation of loyalty to one’s word.”
Seventh: Once again, I acknowledge the truth of an old saying: “He who gives the bread is the one who gives the orders.” If it were not so, I would not be able to explain the presence of certain young people in this circle.
NURULLAH WALIZADA, ANALYST
For at least the last fifty years, solutions to political crises and deadlocks in Afghanistan have come mostly from outside. The difference between an external solution and an internal one — arising from the collective political will of the country’s elites — is that external solutions rarely care about long-term sustainability. Many external solutions fit the description: “throw a lump of clay into the water and walk away” — meaning, done merely for the sake of doing. In my view, this is quite natural.
The Taliban’s rule has created a deadlock both inside and outside the country.
The internal deadlock consists of three parts:
– the denial of ethnic participation through the formation of a mono-ethnic, monopolistic government,
– the direct violation of girls’ right to education,
– the regime’s inability to provide employment and minimal welfare.
To break this deadlock, internal forces needed to take action. But so far, their actions have not yielded results. Military action has been limited, and political action has lacked coherence and has failed to create a new, compelling narrative.
The greatest external deadlock created by Taliban rule is sheltering terrorist groups, especially the Pakistani Taliban. This has pushed Pakistan to at least initiate a process of replacing the Taliban. But this cannot happen without the reaction of other regional countries. Some regional states consider maintaining the Taliban regime for a certain period beneficial to regional stability. These countries inevitably stand in opposition to Pakistan’s interests. Thus, the external solution itself becomes a point of contention among regional countries.
At present, one can say that three external projects exist to resolve the deadlock created by Taliban rule: two regional and one extra-regional (the U.S. and Europe). Iran appears to be the author of one project, and Pakistan of another. Iran also considers the implementation of its project dependent on gaining at least partial approval from Russia, China, and India, as India’s presence in Afghan affairs has recently become more prominent.
There are few details about the projects of regional countries, but if we view the recent actions of several anti-Taliban parties and political movements as an Iranian initiative, we may assume that Iran’s project is one centered on preserving Taliban rule.
It seems that Iran seeks slight changes in the Taliban’s behavior and has concentrated pressure on their opponents. Essentially, Iran wants the more flexible opponents of the Taliban to be prepared to participate in a Taliban-led structure. It also appears that such a project — despite the hostile relations between Iran and the West — is not necessarily unwelcome to the Americans and Europeans. This is why the participants of yesterday’s political meeting were a mix of Eastern and Western politicians.
However, it is unlikely that Pakistan will agree to any project centered on preserving the Taliban as the primary governing force. If Pakistan were to agree to a participatory project, its likely demand would be that the Taliban — even if not eliminated — should not be the decisive force in Afghanistan’s future.
