It cannot be claimed that the Taliban is a religious group; rather, it can be confidently stated that it is an ethnic organization.
Author: Shamsurrahman Forutan (Afghanistan)
As previously noted, we will examine four components to gain a better understanding of this subject. The first part of this article analyzes the word “Taliban” and the term “Islamic Emirate” as the first component. This part will examine the Taliban’s treatment of non-Afghan/non-Pashtun peoples as the second component.
SECOND COMPONENT: The Taliban’s Treatment of Non-Afghan/Non-Pashtun Peoples in Afghanistan
Throughout their rule, the Taliban have pursued highly discriminatory policies toward Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun peoples. Both during the five years of their first period in power and following their second takeover, their conduct and practices toward non-Afghan/non-Pashtun peoples have been entirely inconsistent with Islamic principles and can only be explained within the framework of Afghan/Pashtun nationalism.
The distribution of power in Afghanistan provides a clear example. Throughout these periods, the Taliban have sought to concentrate political power entirely in the hands of the Afghan/Pashtun ethnic group.
“The Middle East Studies Institute, in a report examining the ethnic composition of the Taliban’s senior leadership, estimated the share of each ethnic group in Afghanistan’s power structure. According to the report, Tajiks account for 5% of the Taliban government’s leadership, Uzbeks for 3%, and Hazaras for 0.5%. The report estimates that Pashtuns constitute more than 90% of the Taliban government’s ethnic composition” (Eraf, 2024–2025).
Considering that Afghans/Pashtuns make up approximately 33–35% of Afghanistan’s population (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2024), their control over more than 90% of political power and the exclusion of approximately 65% of the country’s population from governance on ethnic grounds constitute, in the author’s assessment, an openly nationalist and fascist practice that fundamentally contradicts Islamic values.
Such conduct is incompatible with any form of Islam and can only be justified within the framework of the ethnonationalist views of Afghan nationalists.
“The Middle East Studies Institute, in a report on the representation of non-Pashtun peoples in the Taliban government, stated that Tajiks account for five percent, Uzbeks for three percent, and Hazaras for half a percent of the group’s leadership. According to the institute, more than 90 percent of Taliban leaders are Pashtuns. The study also found that 40 members of the Taliban’s senior leadership come from Kandahar Province, while the group’s cabinet includes neither women nor Hazaras” (Afghanistan International, 2024–2025).
Moreover, available evidence suggests that the Taliban register Afghans/Pashtuns who share cultural similarities with other ethnic groups or speak their languages as members of those groups in order to lend greater credibility to their claims of ethnic diversity within the governing structure. The few representatives of non-Afghan/non-Pashtun peoples who hold positions within the Taliban’s power structure have no decision-making authority, and their presence is largely symbolic and merely for appearances. In reality, the principal decisions are made by Taliban members from the Afghan/Pashtun ethnic group.
“The Taliban, widely regarded as an ethnic organization associated with Afghanistan’s Pashtuns, initially proclaimed their intention to establish a government representing all of the country’s ethnic groups after seizing power. Over time, however, it became clear that not only had no inclusive government representing all ethnic communities been formed, but the group had also launched a systematic campaign against the cultures, languages, and historical symbols of other peoples. Consequently, many experts, citing the monopolization of power, the lack of proportional representation of other ethnic groups in decision-making structures, and the policies implemented by the Taliban, regard the movement primarily as a Pashtun ethnic tribal organization” (Independent Persian, 2022–2023).
The formation of an inclusive government and the participation of non-Afghan/non-Pashtun peoples in the Taliban’s political and security structures appear virtually impossible. The Taliban recognize no rights for any group other than their own ethnic community, which is why most of the movement’s members, fighters, and senior leaders are Pashtuns. Such attitudes largely originate from the cultural structure of tribal society. The Taliban is not an ideological-religious movement committed to the corresponding values; rather, all of its actions and conduct are determined by ethnic and tribal principles.
“I insist that the Taliban cannot be analyzed as a cultural or intellectual phenomenon. In essence, the Taliban is a movement devoid of literary culture and cultural foundations. The Taliban rely primarily on tribal traditions and support received from external sources. If we examine the Taliban as a political force, the tribal and regional dimensions of this group far outweigh its religious dimension, while its tribal and ethnic origins are of fundamental importance. The Taliban do not necessarily seek to abandon their ideological cover entirely, since ideology is necessary to justify the existence of a particular system of government. In reality, however, the Taliban have transformed Sharia into an ideology and use it to pursue their own political objectives. Naturally, the group seeks to keep its supporters and fighters mobilized through religious and ideological justifications, but its essential character is rooted more deeply in tribal values. In my view, the ethnic agenda, or, in other words, ethnic hegemony, has always constituted the central element of this group’s strategy. The Taliban have consistently emphasized ethnic issues and even what they themselves call ‘ethnic traditions.’ Sharia is not the central principle guiding the Taliban’s policies and approaches. Initially, we tended to believe that the group was a Sharia-oriented movement that did not place particular emphasis on ethnic issues. However, the passage of time, the Taliban’s conduct in recent years, and our growing understanding of the group have demonstrated that the Taliban are, in fact, far removed from genuine adherence to Sharia and are primarily a tribal movement operating under the guise of Sharia” (Amiri, 2020–2021).
Considering the explanations provided above, it can be argued that the Taliban’s conduct is ethnic and nationalist in nature. In this respect, they are more radical than all previous rulers of Afghanistan who openly adhered to the ideas of Afghan/Pashtun nationalism. The Taliban have established an entirely ethnically oriented government in which no ethnic group other than Afghans/Pashtuns holds any significant position. Moreover, in some cases, members of other ethnic communities are subjected to torture and punishment because of cultural and linguistic differences. Throughout their rule, the Taliban have sought to carry out the complete Pashtunization/Afghanization of the country and bring every aspect of life in Afghanistan into conformity with the cultural values of Afghans/Pashtuns.
Such actions and decisions have nothing to do with the principles of Islam, according to which all peoples, groups, races, religious denominations, and other communities are equal. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the Taliban are a religious group. However, it can be confidently stated that they constitute an ethnic organization. This is because the Taliban act entirely in accordance with the values of the Afghan/Pashtun ethnic group, and their conduct can only be justified and explained within the framework of Afghan/Pashtun nationalism.
