A Comparative Study of the Soviet Union (1989) and the United States of America (2021) Withdrawals from Afghanistan
By Khaledin Ziaei, Head of the Educational Discourse of the Nation Think Tank, especially for “Sangar”
Afghanistan has been the arena of intervention by two major world powers — Russia and the United States — over the past half-century.
Two historical events involving the withdrawal of foreign troops — first the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and later the U.S. withdrawal in 2021 — were not only pivotal moments in Afghanistan’s internal developments, but also reflected changes in the international order and global geopolitics.
This article, using a comparative-analytical approach, examines the nature, mechanisms, objectives, and consequences of these two withdrawals at various levels, highlighting their structural differences and similarities through a parallel comparative framework.
1 - Historical Context and Preconditions for the Withdrawal Decisions by the Two Powers
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989) took place within the framework of ideological rivalry during the Cold War and support for Kabul’s communist government.
However, with Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power and the initiation of the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, the high military costs of the Afghan war and domestic economic pressures pushed Moscow toward withdrawal; the Afghan war had become a “bleeding wound” for the Soviet Union, and its continuation was incompatible with internal reforms and the protection of national interests.
U.S. intervention began after the September 11, 2001, attacks with the goals of dismantling Al-Qaeda and overthrowing the Taliban. Over the course of twenty years, financial costs (exceeding two trillion dollars), human losses, and the failure to achieve lasting stability created a form of “strategic fatigue.”
Shifts in geopolitical priorities and the changing balance of power in the context of Washington’s competition with China and Russia also accelerated the NATO withdrawal under U.S. leadership from Afghanistan.
2 - Legal and Political Framework Analysis of Both Withdrawals
Soviet Withdrawal
The withdrawal of Soviet forces occurred within the framework of international agreements.
It was conducted based on the 1988 Geneva Accords between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and the USSR. These agreements:
- were signed between official and legitimate states;
- established a specific timeline for troop withdrawal;
- enshrined the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs;
- did not include direct negotiations with Mujahideen or non-state actors.
Consequently, from the perspective of international law, the Soviet withdrawal was carried out within the framework of classical multilateral, state-to-state relations.
U.S. Withdrawal under a Secret Agreement with a Non-State and Illegitimate Actor.
The U.S. withdrawal was based on the Doha Agreement (February 29, 2020) between U.S. intelligence agencies and the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban in Doha. The Republic of Afghanistan had no direct role in this bilateral agreement and was deliberately sidelined.
Key features of the Doha Agreement:
- Direct negotiations with an insurgent and illegitimate actor;
- Taliban commitment to act as a ground army to prevent the use of Afghan territory against U.S. interests;
- Release of Taliban prisoners without consideration of the Afghan state and people, particularly the army’s victims;
- Establishment of a NATO withdrawal schedule under U.S. leadership without coordination or readiness of the Afghan government.
From the perspective of international law and state-to-state relations, this model differed from the Soviet withdrawal, as the legitimacy of the Kabul government was weakened during the negotiation process, and the morale and fighting spirit of the Afghan army declined.
3 - Analysis of the Nature of Both Withdrawals: Which Was Real and Which Tactical?
Soviet Withdrawal
- Complete withdrawal of combat troops by February 15, 1989;
- No maintenance of military bases in Afghanistan;
- Continued minimal military and financial assistance to the Najibullah government until the USSR’s collapse in 1991;
- No direct political or intelligence presence after the collapse.
From a military perspective, the Soviet withdrawal was “complete”, though limited support continued for a short period.
U.S. Withdrawal
- Complete withdrawal of military forces by August 2021;
- Retention of economic and intelligence leverage through weekly transfers of funds, exchange of information, and prisoners (control of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves abroad);
- Continuation of humanitarian assistance via international organizations and countries supporting the Taliban;
- Maintenance of the “Over-the-Horizon” strategic operation for counter-terrorism, using combat and reconnaissance drones.
Thus, the U.S. withdrawal was physically complete, but a network of financial, economic, and intelligence influence remained. This characteristic led some analysts to describe it as a “military withdrawal with continued indirect influence” using soft-power instruments.
4 - Consequences and Behavior of Domestic Actors After Both Withdrawals
Consequences After the Soviet Withdrawal
- The Najibullah government resisted for three more years;
- Mujahideen did not sign an official agreement with the USSR;
- With the cessation of aid from Moscow, the state collapsed;
- Civil war erupted among the Mujahideen factions;
Power vacuum and direct Pakistani intervention created conditions for the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.
Consequences After the U.S. Withdrawal
- The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed in just a few weeks;
- The Taliban signed an official agreement with the U.S.;
- The Taliban entered Kabul without large-scale warfare or significant resistance;
- Established a unified political structure under a specific ideology;
- The Taliban Emirate lacks both international and domestic legitimacy;
- Severe economic crisis, rising poverty and hunger, and political isolation emerged.
The main difference is that after the Soviet withdrawal, a multipolar internal civil war developed, whereas after the U.S. withdrawal, power was concentrated in the hands of a single actor coordinated with the U.S. under the leadership of Zalmay Khalilzad. Meanwhile, the Emirate prohibited all political activities, opposition parties, and women’s education and employment, in stark contrast to the Mujahideen period.
5 - Regional and International Geopolitical Consequences After Both Withdrawals
Soviet Withdrawal
- Symbolic sign of the decline of Soviet influence in the Third World;
- Economic crisis and internal uprisings;
- Strengthening of the U.S. position as the sole superpower at the end of the Cold War;
- Increased role of Pakistan in Afghan affairs;
- Spread of instability to Central Asia;
- Onset of civil war with ethnic, linguistic, and cultural motivations.
U.S. Withdrawal
- Weakening of U.S. credibility among Western allies and the international community;
- Increased role of China, Russia, and Iran in Afghan affairs;
- Afghanistan is placed at the center of regional power competition and geopolitical changes;
- Washington’s strategic focus on supporting terrorist groups to contain China in East Asia;
- Concentration and coordination of 32 extremist groups in Afghanistan and transfer of instability to Central Asia;
- Weakening of Pakistan’s influence over extremist groups, particularly the Emirate, to the point of confrontation and existential threat.
In essence, the global consequences of the two withdrawals are as follows: the Soviet withdrawal occurred within the framework of the collapse of the bipolar order, whereas the U.S. withdrawal took place in the context of a transition to a multipolar world.
6 - Economic and Social Consequences for Afghanistan as a Result of Both Withdrawals
After the Soviet Withdrawal (1989)
- Continuation of government structures until 1992, up to the fall of the Mujahideen government;
- Widespread destruction of Kabul during the civil war between Mujahideen parties, driven by ethnic and cultural interests;
- Collapse of the formal economy, expansion of poverty, and emergence of “power islands”;
- Massive migration and the growth of a “war economy” through the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and people.
After the U.S. Withdrawal (2021)
- Implementation of sanctions and blocking of foreign assets;
- Sharp reduction in development aid and brain drain, with skilled personnel fleeing abroad;
- Dependence of the economy on humanitarian assistance from the UN and charitable organizations of Islamic countries;
- Rise of poverty, unemployment, hunger, and drought to the point that impoverished families are forced to sell their children to survive;
A new, unprecedented wave of migration from the country; prohibition of women’s education and employment; ban on political and civil activities, and suppression of opposition under the pretext of fighting ISIS or “rebels.”
Although both withdrawals triggered crises, the post-2021 crisis is ethno-ideological in nature and predominantly “economic-systemic,” aimed at weakening and marginalizing local ethnic groups from power and national resources.
The post-1989 crisis, by contrast, was primarily driven by the protection of party and individual interests and was military-structural and unsystematic.
7 - Conclusion
A comparison of the two withdrawals shows that, although both military powers left Afghan territory, the structure, objectives, context, and consequences of the withdrawals were different.
The Soviet withdrawal occurred in the context of the decline of a superpower and the end of the Cold War, leading to a prolonged civil war.
The U.S. withdrawal occurred within the framework of redefined global priorities and competition with China and Russia, resulting in the rapid collapse of the republican government and the return of the Taliban to power under the Doha Agreement.
From an analytical perspective, one cannot consider one withdrawal entirely “real” and the other purely “tactical.” Both withdrawals involved a combination of military, economic, and geopolitical factors.
The main difference lies in the type of agreement governing the withdrawal, the level of internal and international legitimacy, and the form of continued controlled remote soft influence using “soft power” tools after the troops leave.
Considering the above, it can be stated with full confidence that after the fall of the Democratic State of Afghanistan under Najibullah, the soft influence of Moscow’s leaders on Kabul completely disappeared; their role in domestic developments was reduced almost to zero.
However, after the collapse of the republican system under Ashraf Ghani and the rise of the Taliban, the United States maintained its influence on internal Afghan affairs and the regional balance of power through soft means, such as economic aid and intelligence exchanges.
A vivid example is the weekly transfer of funds, exchange of information, and prisoners, and the protection of vital U.S. interests through the actions of the Taliban Emirate in Afghanistan. The local leaders of the Taliban Emirate, within the framework of the Doha Agreement — especially its secret clauses — are obligated to protect U.S. vital interests in the country.
Therefore, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan can be considered a real withdrawal, and the Mujahideen victory can be described as a historic, memorable, and honorable triumph. The U.S. troop withdrawal cannot be considered a complete withdrawal, as American officials continue to influence internal Afghan processes remotely using both soft and hard tools.
Thus, the Taliban’s victory can be characterized as an artificial and symbolic victory for the U.S., and the Doha Agreement, the weekly fund transfers to the Taliban, information exchanges, and Khalilzad’s occasional presence in Kabul are clear evidence of the hidden control of our beloved country, Afghanistan, through the Taliban Emirate with U.S. involvement.
Ultimately, both experiences demonstrate that the withdrawal of great powers without establishing domestic political consensus and a stable governance structure, particularly without a fair and equitable distribution of power among the country’s diverse ethnic groups, and without ensuring active participation of different ethnic and political factions in political, security, and governance processes, does not lead to lasting stability, permanent security, or a viable economy.
On the contrary, it creates a new phase of structural instability and civil war, ultimately resulting in international fragmentation and political and social distrust in Afghanistan.
